Human dignity and the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras

Human dignity and the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras Cesar Palacios-Gonza lez 0 1 0 Institute for Science Ethics and Innovation, The University of Manchester , Oxford Road, Stopford Building, Room 3.383, Manchester M13 9PL , UK 1 & Ce sar Palacios-Gonza lez In this work I present a detailed critique of the dignity-related arguments that have been advanced against the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras that could possess human-like mental capacities. My main claim is that the arguments so far advanced are incapable of grounding a principled objection against the creation of such creatures. I conclude that these arguments have one, or more, of the following problems: (a) they confuse the ethical assessment of the creation of chimeras with the ethical assessment of how such creatures would be treated in specific contexts (e.g. in the laboratory), (b) they misrepresent how a being could be treated solely as means towards others' ends, (c) they fall short of demonstrating how humanity's dignity would be violated by the creation of such entities, and (d) they fail to properly characterise the moral responsibilities that moral agents have towards other moral agents and sentient beings. Chimeras; Human dignity; Dignity; Human-nonhuman chimeras; Nonhuman animals; Part-human - In this paper I present and critically examine the dignityrelated arguments that have been advanced against the creation of humannonhuman chimeras that could possess human-like mental capacities. The paper is divided into three main sections. In this first section I present a brief account of what chimeras are and what role they play in biological sciences research. In the second section I examine, and show the pitfalls of, the human dignity definitions that for the most part have been used when arguing against the creation of such chimeras. In the third section I investigate the dignity-related arguments advanced by Karpowicz et al. (2004, 2005), Johnston and Eliot (2003), de Melo-Martn (2008), and MacKellar and Jones (2012) and show why they are found wanting. While Karpowicz et al.s arguments have been examined before,1 this paper adds to the current discussion on the ethics of creating humannonhuman chimeras in several new ways. First, I present new counterarguments against Karpowicz et al.s position. Second, I explore, for the first time, the arguments advanced by Johnston and Eliot, de Melo-Martn, and Mackellar and Jones. Finally, I show that from a species neutral perspective the dignityrelated arguments that have been advanced against the creation of chimeras with human-like mental capacities do not only apply to the creation of humannonhuman chimeras that are preponderantly nonhuman, but also apply to humanhuman chimeras, and to humannonhuman chimeras that are predominantly human. The mythological chimera We owe the canonical characterisation of the mythological Chimera to the Ancient Greek epic poet Homer. In the sixth book of the Iliad (179181) Homer narrates how Glaucus, captain in the Lycian army, is going to face the 1 For previous critiques of Karpowicz et al.s arguments see: Streiffer (2005), Robert (2006), Ravelingien et al. (2006), Baylis and Fenton (2007), DeGrazia (2007), de Melo-Martn (2008) and Cooley (2008). Greek hero Diomed in single combat. Prior to their fight, Diomed asks who is he to face for fear that his opponent might be a god. Glaucus responds by telling the story of his lineage, and reveals that he is the grandson of Bellerophon, who by command of King Iobates killed Chimera. It is in these lines of the Iliad that Homer depicts this mythological creature: First, dire Chimaeras conquest was enjoind; A mingled monster of no mortal kind! Behind, a dragons fiery tail was spread; A goats rough body bore a lions head; Her pitchy nostrils flaky flames expire; Her gaping throat emits infernal fire. (Homer 1836) Homers characterisation is not the only one to be found in Ancient Greek mythology. In the Theogony (319325), Hesiod describes Chimera not as a one-headed being with the body parts of three different animals, but as a creature composed of the heads and body parts of three different animals: She [Echidna] was the mother of Chimaera who breathed raging fire, a creature fearful, great, swift footed and strong, who had three heads, one of a grim-eyed lion, another of a goat, and another of a snake, a fierce dragon; in her forepart she was a lion; in her hinder part, a dragon; and in her middle, a goat, breathing forth a fearful blast of blazing fire. (Hesiod 1914) In the broader mythological context the term chimera has come to mean any entity that is constituted of different parts of different kinds of animals. For example, sirens, harpies, centaurs and the Minotaur are considered to be chimeric entities (Anijar and Brem 2003). Chimeras, in this wider sense, are depicted in Ancient Greek mythology both as dangerous creatureslike the sirens, who succeeded at shipwrecking sailors, and the Minotaur, who devoured those sent into his labyrinthand as noble creatureslike the centaur Chiron, who trained Heracles. Non-mythological chimeras In the second half of the twentieth century, interspecific chimeras escaped the bounds of mythology and literary studies to become intentionally created and studied in life sciences faculties around the world.2 Chimeras, contrary to transgenic animals, are not created by the insertion of one, or multiple, exogenous genes. They are beings formed by 2 It is worth mentioning that although contemporary chimeras are tamer than those depicted by the Ancient Greeks we cannot discard the possibility that someone could find a way to weaponise a chimeric being. (Scott 2006; Savulescu 2013). combining the whole cells of genetically different organisms into a single organism.3 The UK Academy of Medical Sciences provides this definition, which I will endorse throughout the paper: Chimaeras are formed by mixing together whole cells originating from different organisms. The new organism that results is made up of a patchwork of cells from the two different sources. Each cell of a chimaera contains genes from only one of the organisms from which it is made. () Primary chimaeras are formed by mixing together two early embryos, or an early embryo with isolated embryonic cell types obtained from a different embryo or cultured stem cell line. The resulting chimaera has cells of different origins, in many tissues. Secondary chimaeras are formed experimentally by transplanting (or grafting) cells or tissues into animals at later stages of development, including late fetal stages, post-natal or even adult animals. The donor cells are only present in a few tissues. (The Academy of Medical Sciences 2011, 1819) Two of the first chimeras to be intentionally created were a goat-sheep chimera and a quail-chick chimera (Fehilly et al. 1984; Le Douarin et al. 1974; Balaban et al. 1988). Contrary to these intentionally created chimeras they can also occur n (...truncated)