Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ and its Troubles

Philosophic Exchange Volume 44 Number 2 Volume 44, Number 2, 2014 Article 3 2014 Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ and its Troubles David McNaughton Florida State University, Piers Rawling Florida Sate University, Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Repository Citation McNaughton, David and Rawling, Piers (2014) "Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ and its Troubles," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 44 : No. 2 , Article 3. Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol44/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more information, please contact . McNaughton and Rawling: Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ and its Troubles David McNaughton Florida State University Piers Rawling Florida State University 1. Derek Parfit’s ‘triple theory’ In his monumental and ambitious two volume work, On What Matters, Derek Parfit seeks to show that, suitably interpreted, three popular ethical theories—rule consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantianism—can be seen as not only compatible but mutually supporting. Parfit’s book was originally entitled Climbing the Mountain; the three theories are like three climbers ascending the same mountain by different routes. As they emerge at the top they realize that they’ve all been heading for the same summit. Parfit regards this convergence as encouraging evidence that he is on the right track—if proponents of these differing theories actually turn out to agree with one another, doesn’t this increase the likelihood that they are correct? We are skeptical. First, we doubt that there is convergence—at least not if the three theories are as standardly portrayed. They have traditionally been viewed as rivals—not only espousing different methodologies, but also differing in their verdicts as to which acts are morally right. But Parfit, as we shall see, does not always adhere to standard portrayals. And there is an obvious problem with this aspect of his approach: the further he moves from the traditional portrayals, the weaker is his argument that the commonality between the theories is evidence of their (coincident) correctness— of course they agree if they’ve been modified to do so. Furthermore, even with his non-standard portrayals, there are still questions about whether Parfit achieves coincidence among the theories—his modifications may not go far enough. Second, we doubt that any of these three theories are on the right track. All three are constructivist, as is Parfit’s amalgam, and thus, in our view, share a common flaw. Constructivism about morality is the view that moral principles—rules about what is right and wrong—are ‘constructed’ in accord with some reliable and justifiable procedure that tests various proposed rules or principles, endorsing some and rejecting others. The moral status of an act is then metaphysically determined by the procedure via the principles it endorses. An act is morally wrong, for instance, because it is forbidden by such a principle, where this is not merely an epistemic Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2014 1 Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 44 [2014], No. 2, Art. 3 2 test—the fact that the act is forbidden by a principle endorsed by the procedure is what makes the act wrong. These theories are constructivist to different degrees, however. Kantianism purports to be constructivist ‘all the way down’. But Parfit himself, and the contractualist, construct a moral superstructure on a foundation of reasons, which are not themselves constructed—in fact Parfit and the contractualist share to some extent our own view of reasons. And rule consequentialism may also be seen as constructing morality on a non-constructed foundation. Before exploring constructivism, then, it will be helpful to give our own non-constructivist view, and in the process we’ll look at yet another constructivist theory, reasons internalism, which is constructivist about reasons rather than morality (and which we also reject). 2. Our view When we wonder what to do, we look for reasons that favor one course of action or another. These reasons to do something are standardly called practical reasons, to distinguish them from theoretical reasons, which are reasons for believing some proposition. On Donald Davidson’s influential conception, practical reasons are belief-desire pairs that both cause and rationalize our actions (Davidson 1963). Thus, suppose I fill the kettle with water, and turn on the power. What might explain this? Well, it may be that I want a cup of tea, and I believe that I need boiling water to prepare that beverage (a fact of which Americans seem unaware!). Then that desire and belief rationalize my action— they make it intelligible by showing how my action contributed to achieving my goal. In addition, according to Davidson, if I did indeed act for this reason (this belief-desire pair), then it caused me to act. I might have several belief-desire pairs that rationalize some act of mine, but what makes it the case that I acted for one pair rather than another is a matter, claims Davidson, of which pair caused me to act. There is a large literature on Davidson’s view. But we may safely ignore it here, since we employ an alternative conception of reasons (what our colleague Al Mele calls, somewhat disparagingly, ‘reasons in the British sense’) according to which practical reasons are facts rather than psychological states. So, for example, the fact that it’s cold outside is a reason for you to wear a coat, regardless of whether you realize this. Crucially, in fact, there are two things http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol44/iss2/3 2 McNaughton and Rawling: Parfit’s ‘Triple Theory’ 3 to be realized. Your reason is one: the fact that it’s cold—call this F1. But there’s also a second (F2): the fact that F1 is a reason for you to wear a coat. F1 is an uncontroversial kind of fact; but F2, if it is a fact, as we claim, is a normative fact. And this claim does give rise to controversy: some deny that there are any normative facts, but we won’t defend this aspect of our position here. Beware confusing terminology, however. ‘British’ reasons are often called ‘normative reasons’ (in contrast to Davidsonian reasons, which are typically dubbed ‘motivating reasons’), so that F1 (the fact that it’s cold) is a normative reason for you to wear your coat. But F1 is not a normative fact. That honor goes to F2. It is hard to explain what we mean by normative. But facts about what you have reason to do or believe, and facts about what you ought or should do or believe, are normative. Normative facts, then, are sometimes associated with standards that can fail to be met: if, for instance, you ought to do or believe something, and don’t, you have fai (...truncated)