A Case for Nihilistic Dualism

Res Cogitans Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 15 6-7-2012 A Case for Nihilistic Dualism Victoria Roeck University of Notre Dame Recommended Citation Roeck, Victoria (2012) "A Case for Nihilistic Dualism," Res Cogitans: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 15. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CommonKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Res Cogitans by an authorized editor of CommonKnowledge. For more information, please contact . Res Cogitans (2012) 3:107-113 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans A Case for Nihilistic Dualism Victoria Roeck University of Notre Dame Published online: 07 June 2012 © Victoria Roeck 2012 Abstract Both Roderick Chisholm and Dean Zimmerman consider mereological essentialism to accurately describe the relationship between parts and wholes. Chisholm supports mereological essentialism because he believes it solves the paradox of coincidence, while Zimmerman embraces it because he believes it helps him defend dualism and refute materialism. In the first part of this paper, I will prove that neither form of mereological essentialism solves the paradox of coincidence because constitution does not entail identity. I will also prove that only nihilism solves the paradox of coincidence because constitution is impossible. In the second half of my paper, I will prove that Zimmerman’s argument against materialism that assumes mereological essentialism works better if you assume nihilism. I will then prove that nihilism is incompatible with materialism, and a new form of nihilistic dualism is the best way to maintain the existence of each person as one persisting thinker. Part One: How nihilism better solves the paradox of coincidence 1.1: What is the paradox of coincidence? One famous example of the paradox of coincidence is the Tibbles/Tib paradox. Assuming Leibniz’s Law, two entities are numerically identical if and only if they have all the same properties. On Monday, Tibbles the cat is a normal, domestic cat. Tib is the proper part of Tibbles that encompasses all of Tibbles except for his tail. On Tuesday, a car runs over Tibbles’s tail and removes it. Tibbles survives the accident because cats can live without their tails, and Tib survives being separated from the tail. Tibbles has the property of having had a tail, and Tib does not; by Leibniz’s Law, they are numerically distinct entities. After Tibbles’s tail has been severed, both Tibbles and Tib take up the exact same region of space. Therefore, two numerically distinct objects are located in exactly the same place. 1.2: What is mereological essentialism? Chisholm’s mereological essentialism seeks to solve this paradox by asserting that in a strict philosophical sense of identity, no object can survive the loss of a part. Every part of an object is essential to it, meaning that at all times (and in all possible worlds) when that object exists, it will have all the same parts.1 Tibbles-on-Monday no longer exists on Tuesday because he has lost his tail, an essential part of his identity. All that remains on Tuesday is Tib-from-Monday (assuming Tib did not gain or lose any parts). However, on Tuesday, Tib-from-Monday becomes a constituent of the ens successivum Tibbles-the-cat (as long as Tib-from-Monday does not gain or lose any parts during that time). Res Cogitans (2012) 3:1 Roeck | 108 Entia successiva are Chisholm’s way of uniting strictly distinct objects into everyday continuants. Chisholm believes that everyday objects persist through time in a loose sense of identity. Tibbles-onMonday is the “same” cat as Tibbles-on-Tuesday just as I play the “same” instrument as Yo Yo Ma.2 The renowned cellist and I do not share the exact same cello, but we play the same type of instrument, a cello. An ens successivum is a collection of successive objects that gain and lose parts but are tied together through a loose sense of identity. For example, Tibbles-on-Monday and Tibbles-on-Tuesday (aka Tib-from-Monday) are numerically different entities, but they are loosely united within the ens successivum Tibbles-the-cat. To maintain the cello analogy, Tibbles-on-Monday and Tibbles-onTuesday are like individual cellos but Tibbles-the-cat is like the category, cello. Plantinga formalizes the criteria for both entia successiva and their constituents so we can better talk about mereological essentialism. Each numerically different entity within an ens successivum is a primary object. A primary object is an entity with only strict parts (S-part).3 If x is an S-part of y, then Plantinga says x and y must fulfill three criteria: (1) If y is an S-part of z, then x is an S-part of z; (2) y is not an S-part of x; and (3) y is such that in every possible world in which y exists, x is an S-part of y.4 For example, his tail is an S-part of the primary object Tibbles-on-Monday because if Tibbles-on-Monday were part of a larger entity, the tail would be part of that as well; Tibbles-on-Monday is not a part of his tail; and Tibbles-on-Monday cannot exist without his tail. Even though Tibbles-on-Monday is a primary object, the ens successivum Tibbles is an ordinary object. An ordinary object is an object that is made up of both S-parts and nonstrict parts.5 (Entia successiva are all ordinary objects.) A nonstrict part of an ordinary object is a strict part of a primary object that constitutes the ordinary object.6 For example, the tail that is an S-part of the primary object Tibbles-onMonday is a nonstrict part of the ordinary object Tibbles because Tibbles-on-Monday constitutes Tibbles. A primary object constitutes an ordinary object if it takes up the exact same space as the ordinary object.7 However, constitution does not entail identity. For example, the ordinary object Tibbles has the property of being able to survive losing its tail while the primary object Tibbles-on-Monday does not. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, the two entities are not identical, even though they take up the exact same amount of space. Another way to think of the relationship between constitution and identity is to think of a river. If a river is identical to the water molecules that compose it, then Heraclitus was right to say, “You can never step into the same river twice.” However, we say that there is only one Ganges, Mississippi or Potomac, regardless of which particular water molecules are present at any moment. 1.3: How does mereological essentialism solve the paradox of coincidence? Now that we understand the basic tenets of mereological essentialism and how to talk about it, let us examine how it attempts to solve the paradox of coincidence. Chisholm states that there are two ways we can treat ordinary objects: either they do exist or they do not exist.8 If you accept that ordinary objects exist, then you have not solved the paradox of coincidence. Chisholm asserts that if ordinary objects do exist, they must be constituted by primary objects.9 In this case, both the ordinary object 2155-4838 | commons. (...truncated)