Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia

Global Tides Volume 5 Article 5 1-1-2011 Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia Ethan Hamilton Pepperdine University, Recommended Citation Hamilton, Ethan (2011) "Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia," Global Tides: Vol. 5, Article 5. Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol5/iss1/5 This International Studies and Languages is brought to you for free and open access by the Seaver College at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global Tides by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact . Hamilton: Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia “Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia” By Ethan Hamilton ABSTRACT This paper outlines three international policy options for Somalia in an effort to begin working towards solving the issues that have plagued the Horn of Africa for over 40 years. A short introduction summarizing Somalia’s tumultuous history precedes an examination of the three policy options. The first proposal, as supported and practiced by the U.S. State Department, is an interventionist policy involving political, economic, and in the past, military intervention. The policy would continue to allow the U.S. to closely monitor Somalia’s struggling government in an effort to maintain and protect its regional interests. The second proposal reconsiders Somaliland’s de facto secession and discusses the possibility of reunification with Somalia. Although not internationally recognized, Somaliland has become largely independent from southern Somalia and functions much like an autonomous state. This policy considers the benefits of Somaliland’s reunification with Somalia. The third and final proposal is the controversial containment policy recommended by several analysts familiar with the condition of Somalia. The containment policy would require the international community to disengage from the current government and allow the country to recover—or ruin—itself. After outlining three possible policies, this paper recommends a variation of the third proposal offered—a policy of international containment towards Somalia, as well as giving further analysis and supporting data. The discussion will conclude with considerations of inevitable challenges and potential long-term goals for the recommended policy. Introduction This paper outlines three international policy considerations for Somalia. The first section summarizes important elements of the Somali history and people as a preface to the discussion of international intervention. The importance of Somali clans, the reign of Siad Barre, and the subsequent international humanitarian efforts to aid Somalia during its famine in the early 1990s, provide a background to the current state of affairs in Somalia today. Saadia Touval, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Tel Aviv University, writes that Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2011 1 Global Tides, Vol. 5 [2011], Art. 5 “Somali nationalism stems from a feeling of national consciousness in the sense of ‘we’ as opposed to ‘they’”.1 The Somali people exhibit an almost unique characteristic in Africa—a deep sense of nationhood. Counterpoised to this feeling of unity, however, Jeffrey Gettleman observes that “Somalia is a political paradox—unified on the surface, poisonously divided beneath. It is one of the world's most homogeneous nation-states, with nearly all of its estimated 9 to 10 million people sharing the same language (Somali), religion (Sunni Islam), culture, and ethnicity.2 But in Somalia,” he writes, “it's all about clan.”3 There are four major Somali clans— the Darod, Hawiya, Dir, and Isaaq. At an even more finely-grained level, there are nearly 1,000 groups, making for complicated and dynamic political allegiances. Somalia attained formal independence on July 1, 1960 with the merging of the British and Italian Somaliland colonies and the formation of the Republic of Somalia. In October 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre staged a coup, ushering in twenty-one years of a highly authoritarian regime through a military dictatorship. John L. Hirsch and Special Envoy to Somalia Robert B. Oakley note that the worst damage Siad Barre did to Somali culture was to politicize clan relations by encouraging conflict at the level of the clan families.4 Barre found popular support by exploiting Somali nationalism and irredentism (advocacy of territorial annexation due to common ethnicity or historical possession). In 1977, he invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area populated largely by ethnic Somalis.5 Almost simultaneously, he broke military ties with their former Soviet allies and obtained military equipment from powers in the West, including the United States. According to Walter S. Poole from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviets reacted by supporting Ethiopia with arms, advisers, and Cuban troops;6 Barre’s troops were quickly overrun and driven back to Somalia. Although he stayed in power after the failed invasion, opposition to Barre’s rule mounted, leading to a full-scale guerilla war in May 1988 that left all vestiges of civil society and government institutions in tatters. Barre’s soldiers retaliated by slaughtering thousands of civilians, but the violent repression only intensified the opposition. After four weeks of fighting that devastated the capital, Mogadishu, Barre fled south in January 1991, leaving behind a carnage that had been financed by a Cold War rivalry.7 Clan warlords ousted Barre in 1991 but also clashed among themselves. Partisans of http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol5/iss1/5 2 Hamilton: Engagement and Disengagement: Rethinking Somalia “provisional” president, Ali Mahdi, fought the clansmen of General Mohammed Aideed in Mogadishu. Arms were made readily available to all sides by both the United States and USSR.8 Somalia as a nation and as a cohesive society dissolved. At the same time, an unusually severe drought struck. In late January 1992, the UN intervened, urging a cease-fire by all parties and imploring nations to contribute to humanitarian aid relief. In July 1992, UN Special Representative to Somalia Mohammed Sahnoun estimated that 1.5 million Somalis faced imminent starvation.9 To mitigate the crisis, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) decided to send in humanitarian relief supplies and the first 500 UN peacekeepers to secure the food. In the months that followed, U.S. military aircraft (in an effort named Operation Provide Relief by President Bush) delivered more than 28,000 metric tons of relief supplies to southern Sudan.10 Unfortunately, looters and armed thugs stole most of the food. Very few people who needed it actually received the aid. On December 4th, 1992, President Bush announced that U.S. troops would enter Somalia in what was christened “Operation Restore Hope” for the specific mis (...truncated)