The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District

University of Richmond Law Review Volume 27 | Issue 5 Article 7 1993 The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District Wirt P. Marks IV University of Richmond Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview Part of the First Amendment Commons Recommended Citation Wirt P. Marks IV, The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1153 (1993). Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss5/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . CASENOTE THE LEMON TEST REARS ITS UGLY HEAD AGAIN: LAMB'S CHAPEL V. CENTER MORICHES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT Like some ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again -Justice Scalia' I. INTRODUCTION Since 1971, Establishment Clause cases have been analyzed under the three-prong test articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 However, this test has often been criticized for producing inconsistent results.3 In addition, inconsis- 1. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 3. See generally Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1993) (arguing the Court's inability to address Establishment Clause issues concretely stems from the Court's disregard of religion's sociological function); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CM. L. REV. 115 (1992) (discussing the inconsistent history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Burger Court); Shanin Rezai, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503 (1990) (discussing problems with the Lemon test and proposing a reformulated version of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment 1153 1154 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1153 tent application of the test by the Court, and conflicting philosophies among judges and scholars regarding the separation of church and state, have resulted in considerable objection to the Lemon test. In fact, at least five of the current Supreme Court Justices have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Lemon test as a workable framework for Establishment Clause analysis.4 In 1992 the Supreme Court by a narrow majority banned ceremonial prayer at public school graduation exercises.5 The Court did not apply the Lemon analysis, a move which signaled that the Court reassessed the future applicability of the Lemon test. However, one year later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District6 the Court failed to reject the Lemon test once again and applied Lemon's three-prong analysis to conclude that a church group's use of public school facilities did not violate the Establishment Clause.7 Consequently, the future of Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains uncertain. Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987) (supporting a revised version of the Lemon test). 4. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J., join, dissenting) ("Our religion-clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Scalia, J., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am content for present purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area."); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately to note that this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman."); Wallace v. Jafflee, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The three-part Lemon test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to realize."). 5. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 6. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). 7. Id. at 2148. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ."); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (extending the Establishment Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 1993] LAMB'S CHAPEL 1155 This Casenote discusses the Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel and the impact of this decision on future Establishment Clause jurisprudence focusing on the application of the Lemon test. Part II briefly describes the history and background of the Lemon test; part III contains an analysis of three recent Supreme Court decisions preceding Lamb's Chapel; part IV discusses and analyzes the background of and the Supreme Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel. II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LEMON TEST The United States Supreme Court has long struggled with philosophical differences and concerns regarding the relationship between church and state.8 In 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education,9 Justice Black adopted a strict separationist standard: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one religion over another ... ."" However, one year later Justice Reed argued for an accomodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause." Noting that Congress aided religion throughout history, 2 Justice Reed concluded that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was not to impose "an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation where [church and state] may work together." 3 These fundamental differences over the underlying purpose of the Establishment Clause have long plagued the Court, leading to inconsistent results and conflict among jurists over the proper analytical approach to Establishment Clause issues. 4 8. See generally Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1984) (tracing the history of the Establishment Clause); Daniel A. Spiro, The Creation of a Free Marketplace of Religious Ideas: Revisiting the Establishment Clause After (...truncated)