Domination, Individuality, and Moral Chaos: Nietzsche’s Will to Power
Undergraduate Review
Volume 6
Article 13
2010
Domination, Individuality, and Moral Chaos:
Nietzsche’s Will to Power
Angel Cooper
Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Cooper, Angel (2010). Domination, Individuality, and Moral Chaos: Nietzsche’s Will to Power. Undergraduate Review, 6, 60-65.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol6/iss1/13
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Copyright © 2010 Angel Cooper
Domination, Individuality, and
Moral Chaos: Nietzsche’s Will to
Power
1
ANGEL COOPER
Angel Cooper is
a senior, majoring
in Philosophy and
English. This research
began in the summer
of 2009 as an Adrian Tinsley Program
Summer Grant project under the
mentorship of Dr. William J. Devlin.
Angel has presented her research
at the2009 Adrian Tinsley Summer
Research Symposium and will be
further presenting her research at the
Undergraduate Mid-South Philosophy
Conference. Angel plans to go to
graduate school for Philosophy in the
fall of 2010.
O
ne of the most well known, but deeply debated, ideas presented by the
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, is the will to power. Scholars have
provided a variety of interpretations for what Nietzsche means by
this concept. In this paper, I argue that, under each interpretation,
Nietzsche may still face what I call, the problem of moral chaos, or the problem of
endorsing the claim that immoral acts, such as murder and torture, are justifiable
as they exemplify the human will towards power over others. I ultimately argue
that Nietzsche’s philosophy avoids this problem: though Nietzsche proposes it is
possible to harm others as a way to power, we should not direct our will to power
in this manner. To illustrate this point, I investigate common interpretations of the
will to power, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most compelling.
From here, I demonstrate through Nietzsche’s passages that he clearly inspires
humanity to direct the will to power towards individual inner growth, and not
as a form of domination. Therefore, Nietzsche does not fall into the problem of
moral chaos.
Part I. The Will to Power: Metaphysical, Metaphorical or Psychological?
In order to understand the moral connotations of the will to power, we need
to first determine what Nietzsche really means by the will to power. There
are generally three different interpretations: the metaphysical, metaphorical,
and psychological interpretations. In this part, I examine each of these
interpretations, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most
compelling.
Those who explain the will to power as a metaphysical description of nature
assert that Nietzsche expresses the will to power as being the nature of reality,
and of all things inorganic or organic. There are two essential components
to this metaphysical interpretation: human beings and the world. Regarding
human beings, the will to power is emphasized as something real in human
behavior. A being is presented as different forces of energy that are constantly
fighting for power (Danto 2005, 199-200). In his posthumously published
notes, Nietzsche presents the will to power as a system of “dynamic quanta”
(WP:635), where such quanta are in a relationship of struggling to overpower
one another. This power must be commanded or balanced to promote a
healthy individual. If it is not, and one force has excess power in deficient
areas, then the individual is insufficient, sick, or weak (Richardson 1996,
39-43).
60 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE
The world is also understood as will to power. John Richardson
(2006) maintains that Nietzsche characterizes all of nature as
the will to power. Nietzsche introduces this idea in Beyond
Good and Evil, where he states:
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire
instinctive life as the development and ramification
of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to
power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic
functions could be traced back to this[,] […]then one
would have gained the right to determine all efficient
force univocally as –will to power. (BGE:36)
This passage illustrates that Nietzsche was working with
the theory that all things are reduced to the one underlying
metaphysical substance that he calls the will to power. Nietzsche
describes this substance as a “dynamic quanta” of energy and
a “force” (WP:619) that is directed outward to overcome,
master, or encapsulate other wills. According to Richardson,
the will to power is an act of “taking power over something
else, ‘incorporating’ it” (Richardson 1996, 22). All things in
nature are consuming other things in an act for power and
growth. As Nietzsche puts it, “This world is the will to power—
and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to
power—and nothing besides!” (WP:1067). Thus, following
this interpretation, we are a force of power. Whether power is
described as an “effortful pursuit” (Richardson 1996, 22) or a
drive to “overcome obstacles” (Danto 2005, 207), it is always
what we are. Here, power is a drive in everything to move
outward and consume space.
Although the metaphysical interpretation can be supported
in Nietzsche’s writings, I argue that there are several problems
with this interpretation. First, it is based primarily on
Nietzsche’s notes and not his originally published works and it
is inadequate to base an interpretation on information arrived
at through Nietzsche’s notes, as it may be the case that these
ideas weren’t fully developed yet. Second, this interpretation
is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s ideas in his published works
because it conflicts with his view of perspectivism, the epistemic
claim that we only have knowledge and understanding
through our human perspective, and know nothing beyond
this. According to perspectivism, we cannot see the world-initself, or the metaphysically real world, but only a world that
is envisioned through our human perspective. Therefore, we
can never truly know anything about nature. However, the
metaphysical interpretation implies that we can know the truth
about nature, since nature truly is the will to power. Thus, there
is an inconsistency between this interpretation and Nietzsche’s
perspectivism. Third, when we examine Nietzsche’s published
accounts of the will to power, we find he primarily presents the
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE
will to power only in humanity, and not in nature as a whole
(see, for example, GM:II:12; GM:III:18; BGE: 19; BGE:259;
Z:II:2). It is only obvious in his notes that he expands the notion
to nature. So, though this interpretation may be grounded in
Nietzsche’s notes, it is inconsistent with his published ideas on
the will to power.
Finally, Nietzsche’s published passages of the will to power that
seem to suggest a metaphysical interpre (...truncated)