Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling
Law Text Culture
Volume 14 Law's Theatrical Presence
Article 18
2010
Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and
Truth-telling
Kathryn Leader
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Recommended Citation
Leader, Kathryn, Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling, Law Text Culture,
14, 2010, 312-336.
Available at:http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol14/iss1/18
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling
Abstract
A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill, more about his or her credibility than a
witness whose evidence is given in documentary form. Oral evidence is public; written evidence may not be.
Oral evidence gives to the trial the atmosphere which, though intangible, is often critical to the jury’s estimate
of the witness. Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) The legal arena may be one of the few remaining cultural contexts
in which live performance is still considered essential (Auslander 1999: 9).
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: http://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol14/iss1/18
Closed-Circuit Television Testimony:
Liveness and Truth-telling
Kathryn Leader
A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill,
more about his or her credibility than a witness whose evidence is
given in documentary form. Oral evidence is public; written evidence
may not be. Oral evidence gives to the trial the atmosphere which,
though intangible, is often critical to the jury’s estimate of the witness.
Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987)
The legal arena may be one of the few remaining cultural contexts in
which live performance is still considered essential (Auslander 1999: 9).
Introduction
The live presence of all trial participants in a shared space is a
longstanding feature of the adversarial criminal jury trial. Along
with this practice is the equally longstanding belief that live presence
facilitates truth-seeking. Going back as far as the trials by ordeal where
a witness’s body was actually ‘read’ to reveal the truth, live presence
has been believed, in various ways, to make the criminal trial safer
and fairer. These ideas currently most commonly revolve around
the concepts of demeanour and confrontation, where the participants’
presence and their interaction will help indicate to the jury the truth
of the matter. These beliefs are, however, largely implicit, contradictory
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CCTV: Liveness and Truth-telling
and generally vague: how and why it may be valuable has not been
clearly articulated until recently. The advent of mediatised technology
into the courtroom in the 20th century led to a renewed attempt to
account for the value of live performance.
In this paper, I examine how arguments about the value of live
performance (whether or not the term ‘performance’ is actually
invoked) have been pivotal in debates about the use of closed-circuit
television testimony (CCTV). I begin by defining CCTV testimony
and examining its current use in courtrooms as a means of mediation
for a ‘vulnerable witness’; that is, a witness who, in the view of the
court, would be likely to find traditional modes of delivering testimony
overly traumatic in legal opinion for a variety of reasons. I argue that
the introduction of CCTV testimony has posed a challenge to deepseated beliefs about the link between live presence and truth-telling
because it is able to leave undisturbed, or replicate, all aspects of the
fair trial (including the need for it to be open) with the sole exception of
the absence of a witness’s body from the courtroom. This has provoked
legal debate as to what is at stake in the live presence of bodies together
in the same place.
Drawing on the work of performance theorist Philip Auslander
(1987, 1999), I will analyse the extent to which CCTV testimony debate
bears out Auslander’s claim regarding the ‘essential’ role of liveness
in the legal arena. As I will show, the legal emphasis on empirical
evidence to define the ‘essential’ role of live presence in various studies
is problematic as it overlooks the importance of belief. I conclude that
it is the beliefs concerning live presence that sustain the routine use of
coercion in the trial and, ultimately, pose a potential stumbling block
to the use of mediatised technology in the courtroom.
Methodology and Terminology
The focus of this paper is to examine debate about CCTV testimony
to illuminate the central role of live performance in the trial and
the potential consequences this may have for mediatisation in the
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Leader
courtroom. As I note in my introduction, the most obvious difference
between the use of CCTV testimony and evidence testing in a
traditional trial is the absence of a witness’s body from the courtroom.
It is my contention that this ‘absence’ of the body has focused legal
attention on the value of ‘presence’. However, when a witness is absent
from the courtroom they are still ‘present’ somewhere; it is simply that
this is not in the courtroom. Consequently, the importance of what
happens in the courtroom is as fundamental as what is happening at
the remote site.1
The metaphor of the trial as theatre or performance is pervasive.
Closer examination reveals that the metaphor involves more than an
acknowledgment of shared features. In fact, more commonly, the
more ‘theatrical’ a trial is deemed to be, the more it is believed to
have strayed from some implicit belief of what it is meant to be or do.
This attitude is in keeping with Elizabeth Burns’ (1973) argument
that a pejorative conception of ‘theatricality’ can only exist if there
is an implicit dichotomy being made between natural and theatrical
behaviour, for example, the trial is about truth-telling and high stakes,
and the theatre is about artifice and entertainment. In other words, the
theatre is about ‘performing’, and the trial is about ‘not-performing’ or
behaving naturally.
Burns argues that the ‘theatrical’ is not a series of specific definable
signs, but rather the ‘double relationship between the theatre and social
life’. For Burns (1973), theatrical practice is ‘both formed by and helps to
re-form and so conserve or change the values and norms of the society
which supports it’. Theatre can therefore be conservative or transgressive
but, in a relatively dialogic relationship, it both affects and is affected by
society‘s collective consciousness. Following Burns, I argue that outside
the discursive space of the theatre, behaviour that is a transgression
of or deviation from convention — that stands out — is regarded as
‘theatrical’ or performative. While, the trial may seem ‘theatrical’ for
laypersons because of shared conventions such as costume and staging,
for legal practitioners the ‘theatrical’ is behaviour that deviates from
habituated courtroom practice, for exa (...truncated)