Introduction
INTERNET LAW SYMPOSIUM
Introduction
Margaret Chon°
In the movie II Postino, Mario, an Italian postal worker, encounters the love of his life at the same time that he becomes acquainted
with the Chilean poet-in-exile Pablo Neruda. The lowly mailman asks
the established poet to teach him how to write love poetry. Neruda
introduces him to the idea of the "metaphor." This idea transforms
the life of the younger man and succeeds in attracting his beloved to
him. The idealistic new poet's life as a family man then triggers
encounters with corrupt local government officials, and eventually leads
to his untimely death at a political demonstration.
The search for the right metaphor for the Internet occupies some
of the "best minds of my generation."' And as with the protagonist
in II Postino, academics' search for the "killer-app"2 metaphor is
intertwined with their attitudes toward government. The themes of
metaphor and government underlie the otherwise disparate methodologies and conclusions generated in the Internet Symposium articles.3
The various authors could be categorized according to their preferred
metaphors, but I prefer to categorize them by their attitudes toward
governmental involvement in regulation of the Internet. Three see
government as a necessary evil, two others view it as necessary and
good, and two more approach it as sufficient but not necessary.
Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, who holds the perhaps
oxymoronic status of a libertarian judge, expresses his skepticism about
the search for a metaphor by rearranging the letters of "information
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
1. Allen Ginsburg, Howl, in HOWL AND OTHER POEMS (1956).
2. Killer application, that is, a terrific software package.
3. The Articles are based on a live symposium held at Seattle University in September 1996.
Internet Law Symposium '96: Second Annual International Law & Policy Summit for the Global
Internet (September 9-10, 1996).
Seattle University Law Review
[Vol. 20:613
superhighway" to spell "enormous hairy pig with fan." In tweaking
the over-used metaphor of the infobahn, he leads into the observation
that metaphors "tend to hide what the real issues are." What are some
of those issues for him? "[T]here's some really pretty extreme things
in here. Do we really mean that communications on the airways can't
be controlled at all? For example, how about blackmail? How about
espionage? How about child pornography? Are you in favor of being
able to download snuff flicks?" With these questions, Judge Kozinski
expresses not only his impatience at the metatranscendent solutions
that the right metaphor will supposedly work upon specific legal
problems, but also a skepticism about what I term the cyberlibertarian
perspective. He is suggesting, astonishingly, that law might provide
rules to govern human activities on the Internet. This suggestion is
startling from someone who might be predicted to embrace the
anarchic, free-wheeling, individualistic qualities of the Internet. The
thought astonishes too because so much of the published legal
discourse on the Internet to date has focused on rules that emanate
from sources other than government-sources such as private
contractual arrangements or even technical specifications-which
regulate behavior on the Internet. 4 Judge Kozinski's metaphor of the
hairy pig is somehow a reply to those who argue that legal rules should
always be decentralized. It is tied to an optimism about the ability of
government to manage this new medium in familiar ways, despite his
general distrust of government interference in private matters.
Jonathan Wallace and Michael Green, on the other hand, are
extremely serious about both trusting the power of analogy and
metaphor and mistrusting the power of government. They believe that
a new communication medium quickly gives rise to a new analogy or
metaphor and that a government that works with inadequate models
for the technology is a dangerous government. Underlying their search
for a metaphorical Rosetta Stone is a skepticism about the judiciary's
4. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); David Post, Anarchy and State on the Internet: An
Essay on law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3 (1995) <http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/
law/publications/jol/post.hml>; Robert Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
ControllingBehaviorin Cyberspace Through a ContractLaw Paradigm,35 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1994);
Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 PITTSBURGH L. REV. 993 (1994);
A. Michael Froornkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE 129 (1997) (also found at <http://www.law.miami.edu/--froomkin/artides/
arbitr.htm>). But see Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)Propertyand Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, The Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996).
1997]
Introduction
ability to fashion a coherent First Amendment law. Along the way,
they also express some doubt about government's role in regulating
speech, a doubt that is of course embedded in the language of the First
Amendment itself. The authors note that medium-specific First
Amendment doctrine, which "examines the underlying technology of
the communication to find 'the proper fit between First Amendment
values and competing interests,"'" has resulted in a patchwork of
rationales unsatisfying to those who value either consistency or a broad
ambit of free speech.
While the Internet as a medium of communication can be
analogized to many existing forms of communication, it may arguably
be so unique as to justify protection even broader than that accorded
to print. Wallace and Green therefore propose that the Internet should
be likened to a printing press or virtual town hall for First Amendment
purposes. Despite their opposite approaches to the question of
metaphor, I place Wallace and Green with Judge Kozinski in the camp
of those who accept government as a necessary evil in Internet
lawmaking.
By contrast, two other authors display what I call a necessary-andgood approach toward government and the Internet. George Chen
describes a comprehensive plan of top-down regulation in Taiwan so
as to implement its NII initiative. The government's role seems
unquestioned as well as pervasive. For example, Chen describes a
recent court decision involving copyrighted material downloaded from
the Internet to make a CD-Rom compilation, which was then offered
by the defendant as a free gift to accompany his magazine. Despite
raising a fair-use defense that was premised on the nature of the
Internet as facilitating the circulation of information, the defendant was
found guilty and sentenced to seven months imprisonment (su (...truncated)