Federal Jurisdiction - In the Absence of Bad Faith Harassment by State Authorities, the Mere Showing of a Chilling Effect on First Amendment Freedoms Held Insufficient to Warrant a Federal Injunction Staying State Criminal Proceedings

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 3 Issue 1 Winter 1972 Article 9 1972 Federal Jurisdiction - In the Absence of Bad Faith Harassment by State Authorities, the Mere Showing of a Chilling Effect on First Amendment Freedoms Held Insufficient to Warrant a Federal Injunction Staying State Criminal Proceedings Robert W. Sheppy Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons Recommended Citation Robert W. Sheppy, Federal Jurisdiction - In the Absence of Bad Faith Harassment by State Authorities, the Mere Showing of a Chilling Effect on First Amendment Freedoms Held Insufficient to Warrant a Federal Injunction Staying State Criminal Proceedings, 3 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 137 (1972). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol3/iss1/9 This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact . FEDERAL JURISDICTION-In the Absence of Bad Faith Harassment by State Authorities, the Mere Showing of a Chilling Effect on First Amendment Freedoms Held Insufficient to Warrant a Federal Injunction Staying State Criminal Proceedings. John Harris, Jr. was indicted in a California state court for an alleged violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Statute.' The alleged illegal activity consisted of the distribution of leaflets advocating change in industrial ownership through Socialist reform. After an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal to the state appellate court, Harris filed a complaint in a federal district court requesting injunctive relief from further criminal proceedings in the California court.2 In his complaint, Harris alleged the unconstitutionality of the state statute on 1. § 11400. Definition. "Criminal syndicalism" as used in this article means any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change. § 11401. Offense; punishment. Any person who: 1. By spoken or written words or personal conduct advocates, teaches or aids and abets criminal syndicalism or the duty, necessity or propriety of committing crime, sabotage, violence or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change; or 2. Wilfully and deliberately by spoken or written words justifies or attempts to justify criminal syndicalism or the commission or attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to approve, advocate or further the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or 3. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates or publicly displays any book, paper, pamphlet, document, poster or written or printed matter in any other form containing or carrying written or printed advocacy, teaching, or aid and abetment of, or advising, criminal syndicalism; or 4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism; or 5. Wilfully by personal act or conduct, practices or commits any act advised, advocated, taught or aided and abetted by the doctrine or precept of criminal syndicalism, with intent to accomplish a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change; Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than 14 years. 2. In addition to Harris, Jim Dan and Diane Hirsh intervened as plaintiffs claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them from peacefully exercising their rights of free expression. Also Farrell Broslawski intervened claiming that the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain whether he could teach Marxist doctrine in his classroom. The Court refused to allow them to join in the suit because their allegations were insufficient to warrant the exercise of federal equitable powers on their behalf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 3: 137 grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. In addition, Harris asked the federal court to exercise its equitable powers and enjoin the state authorities from any further criminal action under the criminal indictment. Harris claimed he would suffer irreparable injury because of the pending prosecution, and the inadequacies of any state legal remedies to vindicate his first amendment rights. A three judge federal district court 4 rejected the state prosecutor's theory that injunctive relief would be barred by the Federal Anti-injunction Statute,5 and granted injunctive relief to Harris. 6 The court held the state statute to be unconstitutional on its face, and saw no reason to abstain from issuing an injunction, pending state construction of the challenged statute. Therefore, the district court issued the injunction. The state prosecutor appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. 7 The state of California, on request of the Supreme Court, filed an additional brief asserting the misapplication by the district court of the judicial exception to the national policy of federal non-interference with state criminal proceedings. The appellant questioned the lower court's decision holding the state statute unconstitutional on its face.8 The Supreme Court reversed 9 the decision of the federal district court, holding that its decision violated the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances. The Court found no such circumstances existing in the case presented. The opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Black, and concurred in by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun,10 attempted to clarify the position of the federal 3. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), held the challenged statute constitutional. However, that decision was overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), when the Court held a similar Ohio statute unconstitutional. The Younger Court did not decide the constitutionality of the California statute. 4. Convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964). 5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964): "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where in necessary aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 6. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal., 1968). 7. 28 U.S.C. 1253 (1964). (...truncated)