COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE

Yale Journal of Law and Technology Volume 10 Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law and Technology Article 2 2008 COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE DANIEL BENOLIEL Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation DANIEL BENOLIEL, COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech (2008). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . BENOLIEL: COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE DANIEL BENOLIEL 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 45 (2007) ABSTRACT Copyright law is not distinctively designed for redistribution. And yet, numerous fairness scholars and other critics of the economics paradigm claim that copyright law should be based upon redistribution,rather than efficiency. Redistributive justice goals intrinsically play a role in the design of the copyright commons, but whether copyright law should itself serve as the means of achieving such goals is truly questionable. This Article argues instead that, subject to narrow exceptions, copyright law doctrine should not promote redistributivejustice concerns and that other, more efficient areas of law such as taxation and welfare programs should do so. This argument accords with the prevailing welfare economics approach to copyrightjurisprudenceand emphasizes the latest Peer-to-Peer(P2P)file sharing litigation. This Article focuses on the leading classes of individuals subject to the distributive injustice that has emerged on the internet: poor infringers, poor creators and wealthy copyright holders. This Article argues that,for at least these three classes of individuals, redistributionthrough copyright law offers no efficiency advantage over redistributionthrough the income tax system and other legal transfer mechanisms. Assistant Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law. This Article was prepared during an Internet Society Project (ISP) visiting Fellowship at the Yale Law School. It was also presented at the Law and Technology Workshop Seminar at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. For their support and advice I wish to thank Mark Lemley, Guy Pessach, Michael Birnhack, Tal Zarsky, Uri Benoliel and the workshop's participants. After June 1, 2006, this Article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 License, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/. Any inaccuracies are my responsibility. Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008 1 Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 45 (2007) 2007-2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS A . INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 47 B. 1. CLASSES OF COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE ....................... 55 ENRICHMENT OF POOR INFRINGERS ........................................... 56 2. ENRICHMENT OF POOR CREATORS ............................................. 3. DIMINISHMENT OF THE WEALTH OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES ........ 60 DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICES: THE THREE ACCOUNTS ....................... 62 1. 2. LIBERTARIAN ARGUMENTS: BEYOND PARETO SUPERIORITY .......... 63 WELL-BEING THEORY: BEYOND BASIC NEEDS ............................. 66 3. WELFARE ECONOMICS: BEYOND KALDOR-HICKSIAN APTITUDE .... 69 C. RATIONALES AGAINST COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ........... 72 D. E. 57 1. 72 I. LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRESSIVE DAMAGES ............... 73 II. DISPARITIES BETWEEN LITIGANTS AND NON-LITIGANTS .............. 74 2. DISTRIBUTION IS OVER-COSTLY .................................................... 75 3. D ISTRIBUTION IS IM PRECISE ........................................................... 4. DISTRIBUTION IMPOSES INEFFICIENT SOCIAL COSTS ................. 78 C ON CLUSION ............................................................................... 80 DISTRIBUTION DISCRIMINATES .................................................. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/2 77 2 BENOLIEL: COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE A. INTRODUCTION Copyright law, like so many normative theories concerning social arrangements, seems to have bent into the dialectics of egalitarianism.' Copyright law is often perceived as a social arrangement, but it is primarily concerned with governing the processes of creation and invention and not simply the proprietary legal entitlements it bestows. However, copyright jurisprudence may have reached a point where it can no longer be said to merely preserve freedom of speech,2 maintain the public sphere, 3 protect subsequent generations of authors, 4 promote liberty and freedom.5 Instead, it now is said to support direct distributive justice ends through what is considered a fair distribution of proprietary legal entitlements. Within copyright jurisprudence, distributive justice functions as a normative claim about the fair allocation of proprietary entitlements among original copyright owners and other individuals in society.6 An 1 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 121-66 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (describing the relationship between the copyright holder and the public in copyright law as a social phenomenon manifested through creative practice, as distinguished from the allocation of legal entitlements); Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 864 (2007) ("Distributive justice must be considered"). 2 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2445 (1998). 3 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 18-20 (1996); Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 360-64 (1999); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 4 See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, Justice Between Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 287 (2002) (arguing that the rights of each generation of authors, including the rights that they might attempt to assert through private ordering measures, be limited for the benefit of subsequent generations of authors). 5 See Yochai Benkler, (...truncated)