Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 8 January 1994 Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature? Mark Kingwell Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark Kingwell, Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature?, 6 Yale J.L. & Human. (1994). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol6/iss2/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . Kingwell: Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature? Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature? Mark Kingwell* Many recent debates about interpretation of the law, familiar to students of legal theory, are determined by a rather simple question-the one I take as my title here-which has, surprisingly, received little explicit attention. These debates are vexed and complex, and have been exacerbated by the personalities of some participants and the professional jealousy aroused by real or imagined transgressions of disciplinary boundaries. More seriously, the recent entry-or, as some would have it, the infiltration-of contemporary literary and interpretive theory into the realm of law has vastly complicated the issues. Those issues include: the proper role of intention in legal documents, especially the Constitution; the relevance or redeemability of claims to truth and objectivity in legal interpretation; the law's epistemological and moral status; and, ultimately, the relevance of legal theory itself to the practice of law. These questions were not absent from the minds of lawyers and legal scholars before the current groundswell of theoretical interest. The study of legal hermeneutics, including much abstract and subtle theorizing about textual indeterminacy, has a long and honorable history--one longer, arguably, than that enjoyed by the study of literary interpretation.1 The "infiltration" problem is that the controversies, innovations, and philosophical questioning of one realm of study-contemporary literary theory-have been translated, and have even proliferated, when similar concerns were raised in the realm of law. The so-called "law and literature" movement * I would like to thank Gail Donaldson, Todd Ducharme, Matthew Parfitt, and Catherine Vacke for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was written with the generous assistance of a postdoctoral research fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 1. Together with Biblical and philological scholarship, legal study provided the controversial texts that prompted the first study of general interpretive theory by German scholars in the early nineteenth century. See Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, Introduction to THE HERMENEUTICS READER 1 (Kurt Meuller- Vollmer ed., 1990). James Farr demonstrates that the German style of theorizing about texts was alive early on this continent. James Farr, The Americanizationof Hermeneutics:FrancisLeiber's LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 83-102 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992). Leiber, a Prussian immigrant to the United States, published the first edition of his work in 1837. Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1994 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 8 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 6: 317 and its attendant debates are the legacy of this proliferation. Most of the current debates, however, can be organized around divergences and confusion concerning the analogy between law and literature. Ultimately, we still need to decide how similar are the concerns of legal and literary theory. Do they speak to the same subjects? In what ways is law really like literature? That is the central question, and though it is indeed a rather simple one, we cannot pretend that it has a simple answer. Nor can we expect, for related reasons, a definitive answer. All available answers to the analogy question, including the one offered in this article, are complicated by various dimensions of indeterminacy, disagreement, and simple cognitive failure. That is, it may prove no easier to answer-in a dispute-ending way-whether law is like literature than it is to say what art is, or what constitutes the good life, or whether a person is trustworthy. Indeed, one of the virtues of asking the analogy question explicitly is that it shows us the problem with our desire for a simple and definitive answer to the question. Having thus hinted at a paradox, let me confirm the hint and offer a blunt answer to the analogy question: law is utterly like literature; it is utterly unlike literature; and, in the end, the question of analogy hardly matters. The question hardly matters, yet it remains significant. Why? Because, it drives a concern shared by many-ranging from those (like Ronald Dworkin) who think law very much like literature to those (like Richard Posner) who think it very much unlike-to find a plausible general theory of legal interpretation. The motive to find such a theory derives from the even more general desire to distill clear meaning from legal texts. Such meaning can take many forms, and there is a bewildering variety of opinions on its status; but, in general, people concerned with the question wish there to be something like the "valid" or "correct" or "true" or even "objective" meaning of legal texts. Just what that something is, and how valid or correct or true it needs to be, are questions that take us into the heart of recent law-and-literature controversies. What we will find in exploring these controversies is that a general theory of interpretation is indeed available, a theory that is both interesting and useful in understanding the status of the law. Whether such a theory additionally secures "true" meaning, or is useful in guiding the practices of legal interpretation, are distinct questions, and I will take them up only in the final section of this paper. To get to that point, I will proceed as follows. The first section assesses several controversies that have become familiar in recent debates over legal interpretation, in particular, the set of allegedly all-or-nothing choices that seem to define the theoretical discussions of law. These debates clarify the stakes in the analogy question. Next I examine, in sharper focus, various versions of the analogy argument: the claims that there are (or are not) https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol6/iss2/8 2 Kingwell: Let's Ask Again: Is Law Like Literature? 1994] Kingwell 319 significant similarities between law and literature. My argument here will be that the question has, for the most part, remained inexplicit. In the rare instances where it has been asked (...truncated)