Cicero's De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Volume 3 Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Article 2 January 1991 Cicero's De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community Amy H. Kastely Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Amy H. Kastely, Cicero's De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community, 3 Yale J.L. & Human. (1991). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol3/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . Kastely: Cicero's De Legibus Articles Cicero's De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community Amy H. Kastely* In De Legibus, Marcus, as the principal speaker and stand-in for Cicero, describes law as right reason, as the selection of justice within a community. Most modem readers have concluded that this description is based on the belief that there is an immutable human nature and a transcendent order in the universe that dictates right reason and thus determines specific rules of law.' And since this belief is said to rest on * I would like to thank Edgar Bodenheimer, John Honnold, J. Kastely, Janice Weir, and Eric Yamamoto for their generous comments and conversations. 1. This reading of De Legibus appears consistently in the standard histories of Western jurisprudence. See, e.g., Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 1315; Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophyfrom Plato to Hegel (1949; reprint, Westport, 1980), 132143; Carl Friedrich, Philosophy of Law in a Historical Perspective, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1963), 27-34; Hendrik Jan van Eikema Hommes, Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy (Amsterdam, 1979), 31-34. Historians generally assume that Cicero embraces Stoic ontology on this point, see, e.g., Bodenheimer, 13-14; Cairns, 132; Friedrich, 27-34. Other scholars also read De Legibus in this way, see, e.g., Marcia Colish, The Stoic Traditionfrom Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1985), 1:95-104; Elizabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, rev. ed. (Ithaca, 1983), 154-59; George Sabine and Stanley Smith, "Introduction" in Cicero, On the Commonwealth, trans. George Sabine and Stanley Smith (1929; reprint, Indianapolis, 1976), 446-51; D.H. Van Zyl, Cicero's Legal Philosophy (Roodepoort, 1986), 36-37; Gerald Watson, "Natural Law and Stoicism," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. Long (London, 1971), 216-38; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, 1988), 70-89 (Professor Wood's reading suffers from his initial decision not to explore connections between Cicero's political thought and his views about rhetoric, p. ix). Alexander Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1991 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 3: 1 psychological and theological assumptions that are rejected in modem thought, the dialogue, Cicero's principal work on the nature of law, is not considered to be of much current interest.2 But the text of De Legibus does not support this reading of Cicero's legal views. Indeed, the standard interpretation depends upon lifting parts of the speeches made in this dialogue and in De Republica out of context and treating them as abstract statements of Cicero's legal theory.' Ironically, De Legibus Litman, "Cicero's Doctrine of Nature and Man" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1930): 25-27 includes the closest reading of De Legibus I have found, but he finally follows a conventional reading. The only dissension I have discovered is Leo Strauss, NaturalRight and History (Chicago, 1953), 153-156, who notes that Cicero raises doubts about the truth of Stoic ontological natural law doctrine in De Legibus. There has been some debate whether the views thus attributed to Cicero are closer to the formulation of Paneatius, a second century Stoic, or the reinterpretation of Stoicism developed by the neo-Platonist Antiochus. This debate is summarized in Elizabeth Rawson, "The Interpretation of Cicero's 'De Legibus'," Aufstieg und Niedergang der mmischen Welt, 1,4 (1973): 340-42, where she observes that many scholars have shelved the debate, concluding that Cicero generally did not draw from only one source. Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa 11 (1949; reprint, Gottingen, 1972), 126 similarly concludes that Cicero does not use the formulations of any one particular philosopher but rather draws upon the ordinary version of Stoic thought well-known in Rome at the time. This view is consistent with my reading of Cicero, although I cannot claim expertise on Stoic philosophy. 2. The discounting of Cicero as a legal thinker was no doubt encouraged by the sweeping attacks on Cicero's political works during the nineteenth century, most notably by Karl Marx, who attacked Cicero as an enemy of popular rule, and by Theodor Mommsen, who criticized Cicero as a reactionary opponent of the enlightened leadership of Julius Caesar. The rejection of Cicero in the nineteenth century is in sharp contrast to the great admiration and influence given to his work by eighteenth century political thinkers, especially John Locke, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and many others among the American founders. See Wood, 1-11 for a good discussion of Cicero's prestige as a political thinker and citations to other discussions. See also Richard McKeon, "Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero," in Cicero, Brutus, On the Nature of the GodA On Duties, trans. Hubert Poteat (Chicago, 1950), 1-9 (discussing Cicero's "persistent, widespread, and ambivalent" influence on Western thought and the fact that he is "little read or admired today"). For a collection of essays exhibiting and arguing for the continuing study of Cicero in a variety of fields, see T.A. Dorey, ed. Cicero (New York, 1965). 3. These writers most frequently quote De Republica 3.22.33 as a direct statement of Cicero's conception of law and then cite De Legibus 1.6.19; 2.4.8; 2.6.14 as restatements of this conception. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, 13-15; Cairns, 137-38; Friedrich, 29-30. And see A.P. d'Entreves, Natural Law (London, 1951), 20-21 remarking on the frequent citation of this passage. De Republica 3.22.33 reads as follows: True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not law its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We can (...truncated)