The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification for Representing Unpopular Clients
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DePaul Journal for Social Justice
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall 2012
Article 2
January 2016
The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification
for Representing Unpopular Clients
Tchia Shachar
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Recommended Citation
Tchia Shachar, The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification for Representing Unpopular Clients, 6 DePaul J. for Soc. Just. 1 (2012)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol6/iss1/2
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Shachar: The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification for Represe
THE ETHICS OF CLIENT SELECTION: A
MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR REPRESENTING
UNPOPULAR CLIENTS
TCHIA (TIA) SHACHAR*
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers fulfill a unique and indispensable role in a democratic society. Albeit the obvious consensus in this matter, lawyers who take on the task of representing unpopular or
unorthodox clients and causes are frequently the subject of
heated debates and controversies.' At one end of the spectrum,
are those who vigorously assert that representing the 'man-introuble' at his worst time is the highlight of the legal profession,
and its source of pride. On the other end, are those who preach
for moral accountability and vigorously maintain that there is
nothing noble in dedicating one's knowledge, skills and scarce
resources for the sake of helping reprehensible people or advancing harmful or immoral goals. 2
* LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Faculty of law, University of Haifa, Israel. The author
is a lecturer in the fields of legal ethics and criminal law, and an Advocate,
member of the Israel Bar Association. Comments and responses may be directed to: . I am grateful to my dear family for their
love and support.
1 The concept of 'unpopular' or 'unorthodox' client cannot be exhaustively
defined, since it is an amorphous amalgam of individual as well as collective
cultural values. For the purposes of this essay, this concept will be roughly
defined as to include all cases which attract negative public reaction (in contrast to public sympathy or indifference) either due to the client's deeds or
ideology. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients,
Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHIcs 214, 225-226 (David J. Luban ed., 1983).
2 For a comprehensive introduction of the moral debate regarding client selection see, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?
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DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
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Such debates and controversies usually produce a destructive
"chilling effect" on the availability of counsel.3 Unpopular or
unorthodox clients, which are often already situated at the oppressed and neglected margins of society, are thus prone to experience much greater difficulties in implementing the
constitutional right to representation and finding a lawyer who
will agree to represent them.
Notwithstanding the core principle of democracy, which provides that every person has an equal opportunity to competent
representation, most lawyers, at some point in their careers, find
themselves being forced to publicly justify their decision to represent certain clients. Common examples include the criminaldefense lawyer, who so (too) often confronts the question how
can he sleeps at night after representing notorious criminals murderers, rapists, child molesters and the like; the civil-case attorney, who often confronts the question how can he look himself in the mirror after zealously representing evil-doers who use
the law in order to advance goals which harm society; or the
civil-rights attorney, who frequently confronts the question how
can he silence his conscience after enlisting to his aid the Constitution or other fundamental norms so as to promote morally
wrong causes and ideologies while society is overwhelmed with
"real" and pressing injustices.
LEGAL TIMES (August 23, 1993) in NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY - PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 630 (1996);
Michael E. Tigar, Defending 74 TEX. L. REV. 101 (1995); Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theatre of the Law, 79 YALE L.J. 988 (1970); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 693-695 (1978); W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual
Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 987 (2006).
3 The cold war period provides us a striking example to that effect. Lawyers
who agreed to represent suspected communists were vigorously persecuted
by both the general public and the American Bar Association. The subsequent reluctance of most lawyers to represent such clients was, thus, an inevitable result. See: JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231-262 (1977).
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Shachar: The Ethics of Client Selection: A Moral Justification for Represe
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THE ETHICS Or CLIENT SELECTION
From a philosophical point of view, criticism or praise of those
lawyers who undertake the task of representing unpopular clients or causes stems from the unique nature of the lawyer-client
relationship.4 At the core of a lawyer's role lies the action of
representation.5 In essence, this means that a lawyer's consent to
represent a certain individual supposedly obligates the lawyer to
enter the client's shoes, adopt the client's problem as if it was his
own; and from that inside and intimate stance, do his best in order to provide an optimal solution for the client, within the
boundaries of law and ethics.
Hence, the conception of the lawyer's role differs from the
conception of the roles society assigns to all other professionals.
For example, a physician neither enters his patient's shoes at any
stage of the treatment, nor takes upon himself the patient's illness as if it was his own; and it is from that outside and remote
stance that he aspires to implement his medical skills to aid the
patient. A lawyer, unlike a physician or other professionals, has
a distinct and unique role in a way that only he "becomes one"
with the client, as a direct result of the action of representation.
Hence, it is the lawyer - and not the physician or any other professional - who is prone to attract public attention due to decisions regarding the choice of clients.
The unique nature of the lawyer-client relationship raises the
question whether the action of representation, which distinguishes the lawyer's role from the roles of all other professionals, necessarily creates an unbreakable correlation between the
personal morality of the (...truncated)