Charles Taylor’s Langue/Parole and Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Networks of Giving and Receiving” as a Foundation for a Positive Anti-Atomist Political Theory

Robert Moore 49 Charles Taylor’s Langue/Parole and Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Networks of Giving and Receiving” as a Foundation for a Positive Anti-Atomist Political Theory Robert Moore It is often taken to be a truism of contemporary political philosophy that the “communitarians” of the second half of the 20th century were advocating a political position in opposition to that of political liberalism. While philosophers who have been labeled as communitarians—namely Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer—routinely eschew the label and the contrast drawn with liberals, the perception of a dichotomy persists. But a more careful reading of the philosophy of communitarians shows that these thinkers are not necessarily opposed to liberalism, but rather “atomism,” which Charles Taylor defines as “a vision of society in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment (sic) of ends which [are] primarily individual.”i A major critique, however, of the opponents of atomism is that they have yet to put forth an adequate positive alternative to atomism. While thinkers like Sandel, Taylor, and MacIntyre have Rob Moore is a 2012 graduate of Denison University, where he received his Bachelor of Arts cum laude in philosophy and served as the president of the college’s student government. His philosophical interests revolve around the nature of freedom and its implications for political liberalism. He is especially interested in the contributions that Aristotle and contemporary Aristotelians offer to today’s political discourse. Rob hopes to build a career applying the knowledge and critical thinking skills he has gained from his study of philosophy in the field of public policy. 50 Robert Moore worked hard to show why atomism is a flawed political approach, and while Michael Walzer has put forth a positive theory in Spheres of Justice that largely draws from atomist presuppositions, a clear positive anti-atomist doctrine has as of yet not been put forth. However, some important groundwork has been laid. A key point of agreement amongst these philosophers is that ethicalpolitical systems depend on certain metaphysical conceptions of the human person. As Michael Sandel puts it, “our practices and institutions are embodiments of theory. To engage in a political practice is already to stand in relation to theory.”ii Some metaphysical understanding of the human person is required to provide a foundation for any positive anti-atomist political theory. This paper will take two theories, one an analogy from language used by Charles Taylor and another an explanation of basic qualities of human society put forth by Alasdair MacIntyre, and argue that they provide a foundation on which a positive antiatomist political theory can be constructed. MacIntyre on Human Dependence Before addressing the themes that emerge from the two theories, I will first explain the two theories as they are put forth by MacIntyre and Taylor. Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of “networks of giving and receiving” comes from his book Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. This book marks MacIntyre’s full shift from his original thesis in After Virtue claiming that the need for the virtues can be culturally determined to the much stronger claim that the virtues that are needed for human flourishing are essentially tied to the needs of human nature. In order to explain this, MacIntyre appeals to the realities of human dependence. He presents his work as a challenge to the history of philosophy, a history riddled with assumptions of the “ability” of humans: From Plato to Moore and since there are usually, with some rare exceptions, only passing references to human vulnerability and affliction and to A Foundation for a Positive Anti-Atomist Political Theory 51 the connections between them and our dependence on others…And when the ill, the injured and the otherwise disabled are (emphasis in original) presented in the pages of moral philosophy books, it is almost always exclusively as possible subjects of benevolence by moral agents who are themselves presented as though they were continuously rational, healthy and untroubled.iii MacIntyre’s claim is that we are, by our human nature, locked in what he terms “networks of giving and receiving.” At some times (notably in developmental stages, periods of illness, and old age), we are bound by our limited nature and must depend on the aid of others. At others, we serve as the providers of aid by helping others in their times of dependence. Further, MacIntyre argues that participation in these networks of giving and receiving are essential to human flourishing. Not only do “we become independent practical reasoners through participation in a set of relationships to certain particular others who are able to give us what we need,”iv but we must also “understand that what [we are] called upon to give may be quite disproportionate to what [we] have received and that those to whom [we are] called upon to give may well be those from whom [we] shall receive nothing.”v Thus, human flourishing grows not only out of acknowledging the dependence one has on others, but also in acknowledging the obligation one then has to aid others in their times of dependence. Taylor on Social Embeddedness Taylor’s take on human flourishing can be found in his essay “Irreducibly Social Goods.” Here, he argues that there are certain goods that cannot be fully described in reference to particular individuals, but only towards more than one individual. He contrasts these irreducibly social goods with the concept of a “public good,” or a good that could theoretically apply solely to individuals. With this distinction, he explains that public goods are simply private goods that are practically acquired through public activity while irreducibly social goods cannot be attained but 52 Robert Moore through social means. His example to expose this distinction is that of the difference between the good of national defense and the good of friendship. National defense is a public good, or a good that is practically acquired through public activity but theoretically could exist on an individual basis. If a household were to raise its own army, it could, at least in theory, protect itself and only itself. Friendship, on the other hand, is a good that can only be experienced socially. A friendship that is experienced by a single individual would not be seen as a good, but rather as a misunderstanding of the very definition of what it is to have a friendship. Of special importance to this essay, Taylor goes on to take a distinction from the linguistic world and apply it to the development of individuality. The concept he borrows is that of langue and parole first put forth by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Course in General Linguistics. According to Saussure, “language has an individual aspect and a social aspect. One is not conceivable without the other.”vi I (...truncated)