How the Sentencing Commission Does and Does Not Matter in Beckles v. United States
ESSAY
HOW THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DOES AND DOES
NOT MATTER IN BECKLES V. UNITED STATES
LEAH M. LITMAN† & LUKE C. BEASLEY‡
INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is
unconstitutionally vague.1 Last spring, the Court made this rule retroactive
in Welch v. United States.2 Then in June, the Court granted certiorari in Beckles
v. United States to resolve two questions that have split lower courts in the
wake of Johnson and Welch: (1) whether an identically worded “residual clause”
in a U.S. Sentencing Guideline—known as the career offender Guideline—is
unconstitutionally void for vagueness; and (2) if so, whether the rule invalidating
the Guideline’s residual clause applies retroactively.3
The questions on which the Court granted certiorari in Beckles turn on
how similar the ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines are. Both the ACCA
and the Sentencing Guidelines impose additional punishment on defendants
with previous convictions for violent felonies,4 and both the ACCA and the
Sentencing Guidelines define “violent felonies” to include any crime that
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”5 Those thirteen words are called the “residual clause,” in both the
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
‡ J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School.
Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky and Song Richardson for helpful comments.
1 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555-63 (2015).
2 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263-68 (2016).
3 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (mem.).
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
5 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2).
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ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines, and courts have interpreted this
identical language the same way.6
But the ACCA and the Guidelines trigger different kinds of penalties.
The ACCA is a federal statute—enacted by Congress—that subjects defendants
to mandatory minimum sentences and increases defendants’ statutory maximum
sentences. With the ACCA’s residual clause, the statutory minimum sentence
is fifteen years; without it, the statutory maximum sentence is ten years.7
Accordingly, Johnson meant that prisoners whose sentences depended on the
ACCA’s residual clause received sentences that were greater than the maximum
sentence provided for by statute.
In contrast, the Sentencing Guidelines are rules promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission.8 Under the career offender Guideline, a
defendant who has committed two prior violent felonies is subject to an
offense-level enhancement, meaning a correspondingly higher sentencing
range.9 The sentencing range, however, does not change a defendant’s statutory
minimum or maximum sentence. While judges must sentence defendants
within the sentencing range that is established by statute, judges are not
required to sentence defendants within the sentencing range that is
established by the Guidelines. Judges retain discretion to deviate from the
sentencing range provided for by the Guidelines.10 Therefore, if Beckles
invalidates the identically worded “residual clause” in the Sentencing
Guidelines, prisoners whose sentences depended on the Guidelines’ residual
clause could still receive the same sentence at resentencing. However, while
judges are not required to sentence a defendant within the sentencing range
established by the Guidelines, the Guidelines’ range has a significant impact
on a defendant’s ultimate sentence.11
6 Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on
ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 64 & n.46 (2015).
7 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (mandating the fifteen-year minimum for those previously
convicted of violent felonies), with id. § 924(a)(2) (fixing the maximum prison sentence at ten years).
8 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (noting that the Sentencing Commission
drafts the sentencing guidelines and “the guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted
by federal agencies”).
9 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (setting the requirements for career
offenders—including the conviction of previous violent felonies—and fixing corresponding criminal
history categories).
10 See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 820 (2010) (noting that United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 259 (2005), “rendered the [Sentencing] Guidelines advisory”); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c)(1) (stating that a court may not impose a sentence “greater than
the statutorily authorized maximum sentence”); id. § 5G1.1(c)(2) (stating that a court may not
impose a sentence that is “less than any statutorily required minimum sentence”).
11 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Scholars of Criminal Law, Federal Courts, and Sentencing in
Support of Petitioner at 12, Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2016) (“Although
the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they have considerable influence on sentencing
determinations because of the procedures courts must follow in imposing sentence.”).
2016]
How the Sentencing Commission Does and Does Not Matter
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This short Essay considers how significant the differences between the
ACCA and the Guidelines are, and how important the Sentencing
Commission should be to Beckles’s resolution of the retroactivity question.
Some of the differences between the ACCA and the Guidelines also may be
relevant to whether the career offender Guideline’s residual clause, like the
ACCA’s residual clause, is unconstitutional.12 But this Essay focuses on whether
the differences between the ACCA and the Guidelines matter to the second
question the Court is poised to address in Beckles—namely whether a rule
invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause applies retroactively, rather than
whether the Guideline’s residual clause should be invalidated.
There are two ways in which the Sentencing Commission might affect the
retroactivity question. One way would be if the Guidelines promulgated by
the Commission frequently affect defendants’ sentences. An important
difference between the ACCA and the Guidelines is that judges are required
to sentence defendants within the range established by the ACCA, but they
are not required to sentence defendants within the range established by the
Guidelines. But that difference should not matter much if judges routinely
sentence defendants within the range established by the Guidelines. As it
happens, there is good evidence that a defendant’s sentence changes
dramatically depending on whether a court is allowed to impose a sentence
by relying on the Guideline’s residual clause. Every court of appeals, except
for the Eleventh Circuit, has either held that the Guideline’s residual clause
is invalid or assumed that (...truncated)