Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company Executives

UNDRESSING THE CEO: DISCLOSING PRIVATE, MATERIAL MATTERS OF PUBLIC COMPANY EXECUTIVES Tom C. W. Lin* “A company that is required to undress in public will pay more attention to its figures.” —Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman 1 I. INTRODUCTION In the summer of 2008, Steve Jobs, the iconic CEO of Apple Inc., 2 came on stage in San Francisco to make one of his grand product announcements. But, without saying a word, his mere appearance—thin and hollowed—sent the company’s stock moving. 3 Apple shareholders and the marketplace began wondering whether his pancreatic cancer, which he was treated for in 2004, had returned. 4 The company refused to comment on Mr. Jobs’ health condition, stating that it was a “private matter.” 5 The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) rules are * Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School. Cert. in Business & Public Policy, Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania. B.A., New York University. Special thanks to John Agozzino, Anita Allen, Regina Austin, Jill Fisch, Kristin Madison and Monica Pal for their comments and criticisms; and thanks to many others for helpful conversations on the topic. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Davis Polk & Wardwell, its partners, or any of its other attorneys. 1. Eric Dash, More Pieces. Still a Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A1. 2. See JEFFERY S. YOUNG & WILLIAM L. SIMON, ICON STEVE JOBS: THE GREATEST SECOND ACT IN THE HISTORY OF BUSINESS 238-46 (Wiley, John & Sons, Inc. 2005) (chronicling in brief the fall and rise of Steve Jobs as a modern day icon and business mogul). 3. See Jobs’s Job, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 68 (discussing the effect of Jobs’s health on Apple’s financial outlook). 4. Id. 5. Id. 383 384 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:2 silent on such situations, there is little legal scholarship in this area, 6 and different companies have varying disclosure practices for executive illness. 7 Further clouding the matter, a New York Times reporter, after having an “off the record” conversation with Mr. Jobs, reported that while his health problems were “more than ‘a common bug,’ they weren’t lifethreatening.” 8 What is an investor to do with this lack of clarity, this lack of material information? Information—accurate, timely information—is at the bedrock of any free market. 9 The market for publicly traded securities in the United States is no exception; 10 in fact, it may be the prime example of an informationintensive and information-sensitive market. 11 The federal government, through the creation of the SEC and the enactments of the Securities Act of 1933 12 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 requires companies with publicly traded securities to make fair, timely disclosures of material information to the investing public. 14 The stated purpose of securities laws 15 is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.” 16 As a result, hundreds of thousands of rules and 6. See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Trouble with Steve Jobs, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2008, at 88, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies /elkind_jobs.fortune/index.htm (explaining that the SEC has not yet taken action against any company for failing to disclose issues about a CEO’s health). 7. See Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008 at C1 (noting that the chief executive of Intel did not inform shareholders of his prostate cancer diagnosis while McDonald’s immediately informed shareholders of its CEO’s colorectal cancer diagnosis). 8. Id. 9. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 488-90 (1970) (analyzing the importance of accurate information through the prism of asymmetrical information in the used automobile marketplace). 10. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1985) (highlighting the importance and costs of information in an efficient securities market). 11. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 341 (1979) (discussing the importance of how timely and accurate information in the securities market can lead to enhanced resource allocation.). 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 74). 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881). 14. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006) (“In efficient markets, information about the value of firms is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”). 15. Use of the term, “securities law,” in this Article refers to the federal securities laws, namely, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See infra Part III. 16. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 2009] DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE, MATERIAL MATTERS 385 regulations—constantly examined and updated—require publicly traded companies to disclose everything from key contracts and financial statements to employee headcounts and perceived risks. 17 While more information has become available about publicly traded companies, arguably not enough information is available about the people who run those companies. The growing regulatory spotlight on public companies has created a penumbra over their boardrooms and executive suites. 18 What does the investing public have a right to know about a company’s 19 executive officers? 20 Is a chief financial officer’s divorce settlement 21 material information? What about a chief executive officer’s sex life, 22 home purchase, 23 internet usage habits, 24 or financial status? How about a 17. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008) (outlining how Regulation S-K under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 spell out the various types of information that a public company must disclose in their respective filings with the SEC). 18. See Elkind, supra note 6 (alluding to the lack of clear guidance from the SEC on private but material matters, such as health issues involving public company executives); see, e.g., Linda Grant, Shareholder Profit v. CEO Privacy: Recent Cases Renew Debate over Disclosure of an Executive's Illness, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at D1 (highlighting the absence of clarity in securities law for disclosure of executive illness). See generally Dash, supra note 1, at A1 (“‘Sunlight,’ remarked the Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, ‘is said to be the best of disinfectants.’ One problem with too much sunlight, however, can be the blinding glare.”). 19. Use of the term, “company,” in this Article refers (...truncated)