Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs

Maine Law Review, Dec 2008

In State v. Hewey, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court found that the sentencing court erred in imposing a sentence that exceeded the maximum applicable period of incarceration for a Class A crime and accordingly vacated the sentence. Perhaps more importantly, the Law Court used the case as an “opportunity for clarification of [its] review of an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial court.” A unanimous court sought to clear up some inconsistencies in previous decisions regarding “the terminology used to define each of the three steps” of the sentencing process by better describing the procedure “by which the significant purposes [of criminal sanction] and relevant factors may be articulated by the trial court in an individual case.” Moreover, the court opined that the three steps were “necessary . . . to achieve a greater uniformity in the sentencing process and to enable [the Law Court] to apply the correct standard of review to each of those steps.” The court’s decision in Hewey was an attempt to help sentencing judges more clearly articulate their sentencing rationale which would allow for more efficient review. The resulting process is commonly referred to as the Hewey analysis. Your analysis here is critical because of the standards of review clearly articulated by the Law Court in Hewey. In the Law Court’s sentence review, different standards of review are applied depending on which step of the Hewey analysis is at issue. The first step in the process is reviewed for misapplication of principle. This standard is less deferential than the abuse of discretion standard applied for the latter two. Because the trial court is in a superior position to evaluate the factors “peculiar to the particular offender,” the reviewing court grants greater deference to the weight and effect given these individualized factors by the sentencing court in determining the maximum period of incarceration and the amount that shall, if any, be suspended. However, the difficultly lies in defining the “principle” to be applied.

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Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs

Maine Law Review Volume 60 Number 2 Symposium -- Nation-Building: A Legal Architecture? Article 20 June 2008 Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs Matthew E. Lane University of Maine School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons Recommended Citation Matthew E. Lane, Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs, 60 Me. L. Rev. 587 (2008). Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/20 This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact . Lane: Statutory Sentencing Procedure THINKING INSIDE THE BOX: PLACING FORM OVER FUNCTION IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURE IN STATE OF MAINE v. EUGENE DOWNS Matthew E. Lane I. II. III. IV. V. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM THE STATE V. DOWNS DECISION STATE V. DOWNS WRONGLY DENIED THE SENTENCING JUDGE THE DISCRETION TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT’S BROADER COURSE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS CONCLUSION Published by University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons, 2008 1 Maine Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 2 [2008], Art. 20 588 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2 THINKING INSIDE THE BOX: PLACING FORM OVER FUNCTION IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURE IN STATE OF MAINE v. EUGENE DOWNS Matthew E. Lane* I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM Consider the following hypothetical: You are a Maine Superior Court justice sitting in Waldo County. As you don your robe and proceed to the court room, you are keenly aware of your responsibility today. Today you will be presiding over a sentencing hearing. A week ago, you presided over a Rule 111 proceeding in which Jonathan Lowell2 entered an open guilty plea3 to eighteen counts of burglary4 and theft,5 and one count of arson.6 Over the course of five months, Mr. Lowell had engaged in what can only be described as a crime spree. The counts break down as follows: six counts of Class B burglary of a dwelling place or residence;7 three counts of Class C burglary of a business;8 one count of Class B theft of a firearm;9 one count of Class B theft;10 five counts of Class C theft;11 two counts of Class D theft;12 and one count of Class A arson.13 Mr.Lowell has no prior criminal record. * J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Maine School of Law. The author wishes to thank his wife, Erin, for her unending love and support. Also, thank you to Professor Melvyn Zarr whose invaluable counsel helped make this Note possible. 1. ME. R. CRIM. P. 11 (Pleas; Acceptance of a Plea to a Charge of a Class C or Higher Crime). 2. This name is a creation of the author. It is not intended as a representation of any person living, or deceased. 3. An open plea, also called a blind plea, is a guilty plea made “without the promise of a concession from either the judge or the prosecutor.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (3d Pocket ed. 1996). 4. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 401(1)(A) (2006) (“A person is guilty of burglary if . . . [t]he person enters or surreptitiously remains in a structure knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do so, with the intent to commit a crime therein.”). 5. Id. § 353(1)(A) (“A person is guilty of theft if . . . [t]he person obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with intent to deprive the other person of the property.”). 6. Id. § 802(1)(A) (“A person is guilty of arson if he starts, causes, or maintains a fire or explosion . . . [o]n the property of another with the intent to damage or destroy property thereon . . . .”). Jonathan Lowell burglarized a machine shop where he previously worked. Upon leaving the shop, he set fire to his former boss’s office. 7. Id. § 401(1)(B)(4) (stating that if the violation is “against a structure that is a dwelling place,” the violation “is a Class B crime.”). 8. Id. § 401(1)(A) (“Violation of this paragraph is a Class C crime . . . .”). 9. Id. § 353(1)(B)(2) (if the property stolen is “a firearm or an explosive device,” the violation “is a Class B crime.”). 10. Id. § 353(1)(B)(1) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $10,000,” the violation “is a Class B crime.”). 11. Id. § 353(1)(B)(4) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $1,000 but not more than $10,000,” the violation “is a Class C crime.”). 12. Id. § 353(1)(B)(5) (if the property stolen is valued at “more than $500 but not more than $1,000,” the violation “is a Class D crime.”). 13. Id. § 802(3) (“Arson is a Class A crime.”). https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/20 2 Lane: Statutory Sentencing Procedure 2008] STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURE 589 In the week leading up to the sentencing hearing, you have been burdened with the task of sorting through the various offenses and attempting to impose a sentence that meets the purposes of criminal sentencing found in the Maine Criminal Code.14 You have sought to impose a sentence that will balance the appropriate deterrent effect and the required restraint of Mr. Lowell in the interest of public safety15 with the goal of minimizing correctional experiences which might promote further criminality.16 Moreover, you want to promote general deterrence17 and uniformity of sentences18 while still imposing a differentiated sentence to facilitate equitable individualization of sentences.19 In addition, you must also ensure that the sentence does not diminish the gravity of the convicted criminal conduct20 and at the same time encourage restitution whenever possible.21 Pursuant to Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, if you impose a sentence of one year or more, you must set forth on the record the reasons for that sentence.22 As you sift through possible prison terms and review the pre-sentence investigation report,23 you examine your options in setting the final sentence for 14. See generally id. § 1151 (2006). This statute describes the purposes of criminal sentencing as follows: 1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when required in the interest of public safety; 2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be compensated and other purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served. [sic] 3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further criminality; 4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on the conviction of a crime; 5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unre (...truncated)


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Matthew E. Lane. Thinking Inside the Box: Placing Form Over Function in the Application of the Statutory Sentencing Procedure in State of Maine v. Eugene Downs, Maine Law Review, 2008, Volume 60, Issue 2,