ON THE PRACTICAL IRRATIONAL OF IMMORALITY

ON THE PRACTICAL IRRATIONAL OF IMMORALITY _________ MICHAEL NELSON University of California at Riverside Department of Philosophy Riverside California U.S.A. Article info CDD: 128.33 Received: 10.08.2018; Accepted: 21.08.2018 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2018.V41N4.MN Keywords: Morality Autonomy Practical Reason Abstract: I argue that the Formula of Humanity, the principle that we should always treat the humanity of a person as an end in itself and never as a mere means, is a principle of pure practical reason. Insofar as that principle is also the fundamental grounds of morality, it follows, then, that all autonomous rational agents are committed to morality. ON THE PRACTICAL IRRATIONAL OF IMMORALITY According to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, the second formulation of his Categorical Imperative, we should always treat the humanity of persons as an end in itself and never a mere means. This principle is put forward as a version of the “supreme principle of morality,” providing the grounds of all moral requirements. A choice is morally Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 4, pp. 389-429, Oct-Dec. 2018. On The Practical Irrational Of Immorality 390 impermissible, then, because it involves treating humanity as a mere means. Treating humanity as a mere means is the mark of the immoral, casting explanatory light on the immorality of any given immoral action. And, on Kant’s view, moral requirements are always overriding, in the sense that, if one has most reason to do x, then one should, all things considered and simpliciter, do x. So, insofar as the FH is the fundamental principle of morality, then, it follows that it must be itself a principle of pure practical reason (or at least implied by something that is a principle of pure practical reason). The FH is claimed to have a peculiar set of features: Unlike specific requirements like not killing the innocent or deceiving another for one’s own amusement, the FH is sufficiently general to be the foundation of all of morality; unlike purely formal principles of reason, such as the principle to always do what one has most reason to do and even the instrumental principle to take the necessary means to one’s intended ends, the FH is substantive; and unlike, for example, principles of etiquette, the FH is constitutive of rational agency as such. In this essay I develop an account of treating humanity as a mere means. I argue that treating the humanity of a person as a mere means involves judging the relative worth of one’s contingent end to be more valuable than the worth of that person’s humanity. Call this the Evaluativist understanding of the FH. I contrast this understanding with other competing understandings and interpretations of the FH, in particular the Consent Conception of the FH. I am less interested in interpreting Kant’s writings on the FH, although I think that the Evaluativist conception fits the whole of the text better than the Consent conception. I am more interesting in arguing the FH, understood as the Evaluativist does, is true and accepting it helps to make progress defending the moral rationalism articulated in the opening paragraphs above. To act immorally, then, is, on Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 4, pp. 389-429, Oct-Dec. 2018. Michael Nelson 391 the view to be developed, to treat the humanity of a person as a mere means, which is to act in a way that, were one fully articulate and coherent, involves judging one’s adopted end to be more valuable than the humanity of a person. This is practically irrational, and so a course of action that one should not, full stop and simpliciter, do, because every autonomous practical reasoner is rationally committed to judging humanity to be a grounding value, which is a judgment inconsistent with the judgment that one’s adopted ends are more valuable than the humanity of a person. I argue this by developing a realist, cognitivist version of Kant’s regressive argument for the value of humanity. On this view, the value of humanity is not the source of value but instead the rational grounds for one’s placing the importance one does on some value, a value which, for all the argument is concerned, may have grounds independent of choice, as the realist claims. While Kant may well have been a constructivist about value, that is not, I think, what his regressive argument for the value of humanity requires or shows. Moral rationalism is the thesis that all moral demands are, at their ground, principles of practical reason as such, so that in acting immorally, one acts contrary to what one should do. Sometimes the dictates of a domain, say the dictates of being a strong advocate for one’s students, require doing something, say, overstating a student’s abilities, that one should not, all things considered, do. That is, the dictates of that domain conflict with the dictates of pure practical reason, as those dictates are outweighed by competing considerations. It is intuitive to maintain that mismatches between the dictates of morality and the dictates of practical reason do not exist. The ‘should’ of practical reason and the ‘should’ of morality speak with a single tongue. That is the thesis of moral rationalism. Moral rationalism promises a robust defense of morality’s authority. If moral demands just are demands of Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 4, pp. 389-429, Oct-Dec. 2018. On The Practical Irrational Of Immorality 392 practical reason, the ammoralist’s challenge Why be moral? is equivalent to the challenge Why should I do what I have most reason to do?, which presupposes the very authority it questions. Given moral rationalism, a person unconcerned about others is not merely unattractive, unappealing, distasteful, and a jerk; such an agent is also practically irrational, which is a criticism internal to the agent’s own point of view, whatever her contingent aims and concerns happen to be. The immoral agent violates requirements that are constitutive of the bare activity of autonomous choosing. Her action is self‐defeating in the sense that the commitments she undertakes in choosing to act as she does are guaranteed to be inconsistent and so it is impossible for her to satisfy them all. Many have thought that the promise of moral rationalism rests on a sleight of hand, as the rationalist employs one set of principles when arguing that the fundamental principles of morality are principles of practical reason and subtly different principles when deriving particular substantive moral demands. The worry is that there is no single set of principles that are both genuine principles of pure practical reason, principles that every rational agent, whatever her contingent concerns, cares, and projects, is committed to, and that deliver substantive moral requirements. I am sympathetic with to this concern and want in this paper to begin to address it. Here I take only the first steps in a defense of moral rationali (...truncated)