Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times

Chicago-Kent Law Review, May 2019

This article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period. The period since 2016 has seen several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-benefit analysis. This period also contains important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in which regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs under Trump. The Trump Administration’s regulatory review initiatives focus heavily on costs, with limited attention to benefits. Case studies of three high-profile regulations show that the economic analysis of one is seriously defective, another admits to having severe limitations, and a third systematically reduces the scale of benefits. Some of these characteristics may be analytically defensible, others seemingly are not. It is even harder to connect Congress’s recent uses of the Congressional Review Act to either a concern about net benefits or even a desire to reduce the economic burdens of regulation. Thus, cost-benefit analysis seems overall a marginal part of current regulatory policymaking.

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Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times

Chicago-Kent Law Review Volume 94 Issue 2 The Trump Administration and Administrative Law Article 7 5-1-2019 Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times Daniel A. Farber UC Berkeley School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the President/ Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 383 (2019). Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol94/iss2/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 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Daniel A. Farber. Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2019, pp. 383, Volume 94, Issue 2,