Evolution of the phenomenon of war

Edyta Pankowska Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna, Wydział Cybernetyki Evolution of the phenomenon of war Abstract The aim of this article is to analyze the evolution of wars over the centuries and the reasons for their occurrence. The author raises issues forming the basis of thinking about armed conflicts from the perspective of researchers, state governments, the world of busi‑ ness and ordinary citizens. A number of selected concepts of warfare by the most important authors of various eras were presented. Investigation of factors having influence on armed conflicts also contributed to the attempt to determine the impact of such factors as techno‑ logical progress, geographical, political, social and other conditions, causing or reducing the likelihood of war. In addition, four schools of warfare were presented regarding the sources of advantage between the parties of the conflict. An analysis of a number of cases, examples and views allowed specifying the author’s own view, leaning towards a rational‑ istic theorem, propagated inter alia by JD Fearon. According to him, armed conflicts mainly break out when they are profitable or more favorable than other, peaceful alternatives. An important difference between the “old” and “new” wars is primarily the asymmetry of conflicts resulting not only from the technological, economic or social disproportion, but rather the possibility of remote impact, as some world powers do. This allows for a cheaper war with a limited use of military force. Keywords: evolution of wars, armed conflicts, asymmetry of conflicts Introduction It often happens that the common perception of the nature of the events that sur‑ round us is different from reality. It can be similar in the case of the sources, way of conducting, and the evolution of wars. The outbreak of armed conflict can be compared to an accident, unexpected consequences of events that have spiraled out of control. In the consciousness of ordinary citizens war usually appears as an unnecessary shedding of blood that should never take place. In practice, however, Studia Administracji i Bezpieczeństwa nr 7/2019 military conflicts can also be used as a political instrument, a tool for exerting influence onto opponents. The history of Europe has proved many times that the war served as a chance to check the power of states, as well as an opportunity to gain prestige, fame and wealth. The wars were carried out in order to acquire new territories, defend honor, or push for individual efforts to maintain high posi‑ tion at the international arena. It is worth mentioning the words of Charles Tilly, who claimed that “war made the state, and the state made war”1. Just like cen‑ turies ago, the military potential, size of army and population contribute to the power of the states. However, this is not the only determinant of strength or root of success. There is a much wider spectrum of factors affecting whether a given country is more powerful than its adversaries, and thus is more inclined to expand its influence by entering into armed conflicts. This tendency of warfare has been determined by the technological superiority of the arsenal, the organization of armed forces and the natural geostrategic position2.The problem accompanying the deliberations is focused on the two questions: what are the reasons for wag‑ ing war, and what factors reduce or increase the probability of an armed conflict. 1. Causes of wars Looking back at the human history, wars have become an inseparable part of our civilization, although the accompanying customs, warfare style or tactics have been constantly changing over the centuries3. Due to the wide variety of their nature, circumstances, and manner of conducting, it is worth discussing this topic more broadly. In the opinion of S. Van Ever, several key elements contribute to a number of factors that accompany the emergence of wars: 1. Optimistic and confident assessment of the resources and capabilities of the state, and, consequently, overestimation of results in the event of a war, 2. The natural advantage of the initiator of a potential conflict. In other words, circumstances favoring the first to mobilize forces and strike, 3. Decisive and rapid changes in the geopolitical arena in given conditions which may generate significant profits or benefits difficult to achieve by other means, 4. Accumulation of resources, possession of which favors the control of ever larger quantities, 1 2 3 Ch. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990, Basil Blackwell, p. 32. T. C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven 1966, p. 234. L. Stomma, Antropologia Wojny, Iskry2014, p. 10-21. 196 Edyta Pankowska, Evolution of the phenomenon... 5. The conquest is easy to implement, and the prevailing circumstances favor an expansive policy4. In the context of the above, numerous researchers, including S. Van Evera, look for answers for the question of the basic reasons for waging a war. The fulfillment of these considerations is an attempt to find regularities conducive to conflict in specific circumstances and time. S. Van Evera distinguishes the basic sources of wars, also using own subjective perspective as a researcher. This is a kind of synthesis and supplement of the five, aforementioned points. First of all, he cause of armed conflict may be conviction of the community of impending serious danger. Additional circumstances favorable in the form of hostile policy of adversaries only fuel this anxiety, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Addi‑ tionally, if the conquest seems easy and the war is relatively cheap, the force policy turns out to be the most effective strategy. This drives the self-belief in the need for a sustainable development of the armed forces, which increasingly gain a stronger position in the state and gradually protect their own interests by proclaiming their autonomy. The second fundamental cause is the frequent phenomenon of build‑ ing the national spirit based on the glorification of its own history and the creation of myths about the glory of past centuries, while the other adversaries are pre‑ sented in a different, often overly critical manner. The message created in this way is strengthened and maintained by the state education system, which once again contributes to the overly optimistic assessment of the future and results of potential conflicts. The third pillar of wars is the attitude of the state apparatus and bureau‑ cracy incapable of a reliable self-assessment of own actions. Here also appears the role of researchers and experts who fearing criticism do not assess reliably, serving indulgent flattering evaluations. As S. V. Evera concludes – “speaking the truth about authorities is rarely rewarded and punished often, so the important truths are often unspoken”5. The dominant states are eager to provoke crises in order to multiply profits and impose their own primacy on the opponents. The effects, dif‑ ficult to ass (...truncated)