Contemporary generations of offensive and defensive weapons

Zuzanna Szpakowska Wojkowa Akademia Techniczna Contemporary generations of offensive and defensive weapons Abstract This article deals with the problem of distinguishing between offensive and defen‑ sive weapons in the context of international security and its influence on the evolution of wars with particular emphasis on modern times. The nuclear weapon deserves particular attention because of its dual nature – both offensive and defensive, which resulted, among other things, in the development of a strategy of deterrence. What is more, its presence in the arsenals of the great powers causes that international politics is much more prudent, and the classic, territorial concept of security has lost its importance. By analyzing the most important sources of military threats, the author concretizes her reflections on the example of Poland and its contemporary situation regarding the issues discussed. The main research problem raised in this article is the question –what is the impact of modern weapons generations on international politics in the context of military security? Keywords: offensive weapon, defensive weapon, weapon diversity, nuclear weapon, cold war Introduction In the common understanding of armed conflicts, important details of the art of war, conducting military operations with a clean profit and loss account are often lost account for the general impression of destruction and the clash of hostile forces. Referring to the basic theory of war, and in particular the attack / defense ratio that each army represents, it is easy to see the dependence, according to which the probability of conflict increases diametrically when one of the parties is strongly convinced of the ease of conquest with low effort. It is not difficult to support this thesis just by a common sense. It is enough to rely on the events of the newest history – the 1980s, when numerous movements for peace inspired by the above mentioned thesis proclaimed that the progressive reinforcement of defensive powers would help maintain the world order and the balance of power Studia Administracji i Bezpieczeństwa nr 7/2019 between East and West. This concept assumed that high risk of losses incurred by the aggressor puts in question the sense of the offensive. A practical manifesta‑ tion of this theory was the military doctrine of the Soviet Union under the rule of M. Gorbachev, when it was decided to strongly expand the defensive potential of Soviet army1. In retrospect, it can be said that the defensive military doctrine of both blocks has brought the expected result – no one has attacked. However, the armament is being produced and constantly modernized not only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and defending the territory. It is possible to use the same weapon for defensive and offensive purposes. This article focuses on expla‑ nation of thes aforementioned relationships. Author’s analysis of their influence on evolution of wars over the years allows forecasting further evolution of con‑ temporary, as well as future conflicts. The main thesis put forward by the author assumes that the mere fact of having a given type of weaponry is not enough to achieve the desired political or military goals. 1. The distinction between offensive and defensive weapons The attack / defense relationship described in the introduction determines the ratio of the aggressor’s costs to conduct offensive actions in order to balance the opponent’s defensive power. The greater the difference is, the higher offensive investment is needed, and the greater is the defensive power of the opponent. This in turn is converted on the multiplied attack / defense ratio, the result of which illustrates the real defense capabilities of a given army or country2. The above observation leads to further conclusions. Security is seen as a simple resultant of opposing variables – the power of attack and the power of defense in given circumstances, place and time. When offensive forces gain an advantage, then the phenomenon popularly known as the armaments race can be observed. It is dangerous when easy conquest with low cost is feasible. Then,potential aggressor is more encouraged to start warfare. In the case, however, when both the offen‑ sive and defensive potential of both sides seem to be similar, or they represent a completely different, difficult to unequivocally compare state, then the chances of peaceful cooperation and coexistence grow. This is also directly reflected in the type of weapon they have. If it serves mainly to defend the territory, then it does not raise objections among neighboring countries. It is different when offensive 1 2 V. Evera,Causes of War, London 1999, p. 117-119. Ch. L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists. Cooperation as Self-Help, “International Security” 1994/1995, No. 3, p. 106-107. 212 Zuzanna Szpakowska, Contemporary generations of offensive... advantage is developed, allowing for the destruction of the enemy, which for obvi‑ ous reasons overcomes the dilemma of mutual security. An interesting example depicting the aforementioned case is nuclear weapon, which, even if intended only for defense, also leads to alleviating the security dilemma. Summing up the criteria presented above that affect the offensive and defensive potential of the opponents;it is possible to specify four basic states: 1. Advantages of an attack, in the absence of knowledge about the intentions of others, while armaments are indistinguishable (doubly unstable), 2. Advantages of an attack when the intentions of others are known while armaments are distinguished (unstable), 3. The advantages of defense, in the absence of knowledge about the intentions of others, while armaments are indistinguishable (stable), 4. The advantages of defense when the intentions of others are known and armaments are distinguished (double stable)3. In the context of the above, it should be noted that the most dangerous situation (double unstable) occurs when the offensive and defensive forces are not distinguishable, and there is an advantage of the attack. In other words, when ensuring security is easier through attack than defense, it is difficult to preserve the balance between countries. One can see the paradox in this situation, when the increase of the power of one of the parties is connected with the relative weakness of the opposing states. What’s more, the increase in the power of the former ensures its security to a lesser extent than it poses a threat to the opponents, as they are forced to increase defense expenditures to be able to resist potential aggression. This arma‑ ment spiral can be supplemented by a situation in which offensive and defensive units are not distinguishable, and both sides develop analogous measures. Then the circumstances become doubly unstable, which favors mutual fear of attack. Another version of events can be observed in the third variant, when there is no distinguishability of owned weapo (...truncated)