Towards Nondelegation Doctrines

Missouri Law Review Volume 86 Issue 4 Article 7 Fall 2022 Towards Nondelegation Doctrines Chad Squitieri Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Chad Squitieri, Towards Nondelegation Doctrines, 86 MO. L. REV. (2022) Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . Squitieri: Towards Nondelegation Doctrines Towards Nondelegation Doctrines Chad Squitieri* ABSTRACT When discussing the nondelegation doctrine, courts and scholars frequently refer to Congress’ “legislative power.” The Constitution, however, speaks of no such thing. Instead, the Constitution vests a wide variety of “legislative powers” (plural) in Congress, including the powers to “regulate commerce,” “declare war,” “coin money,” and “constitute tribunals.” Shoehorning Congress’ diverse array of powers into a one-size-fits-all nondelegation doctrine has necessitated the development of the vaguely worded “intelligible principle” test. Unsurprisingly, that malleable test has failed to produce a judicially manageable standard. In response, this Article proposes that the nondelegation doctrine be transformed into a series of nondelegation doctrines, each corresponding to one of Congress’ distinct powers. Adopting such an approach can lessen the risk that reviving the nondelegation principle – a task the current Supreme Court has expressed an interest in taking on – will result in a complete reworking of the modern administrative state. * The views expressed in this Article are mine alone, and should not be attributed to my employer. I would like to thank Kent Barnett, Kristen Hickman, Gary S. Lawson, Cynthia L. Nicoletti, Nicholas R. Parrillo, Michael D. Ramsey, Michael B. Rappaport, Aaron M. Smith, Adam J. White, Ilan Wurman and the editors of the Missouri Law Review for their comments on previous drafts. Any remaining errors are my own. Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022 1 Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 7 1240 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT…......................................................................................... 1239 TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................. 1240 I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1241 II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE ...................................................... 1244 A. The Intelligible Principle Test .................................................... 1245 B. No Judicially Manageable Standard ........................................... 1248 C. Turning to History...................................................................... 1251 III. INTRODUCING NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES.................................... 1258 A. Powers Not Power...................................................................... 1258 B. Congress’ Original Legislative Powers ...................................... 1264 C. Congress’ Other Original Powers .............................................. 1270 D. The Sixteenth Amendment .......................................................... 1275 E. Appropriate Legislation Powers ................................................. 1277 F. “By Law” Powers ...................................................................... 1286 IV. DEFENDING NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES ....................................... 1290 A. Lowering the Stakes ................................................................... 1290 B. Judicially Manageable Standards ............................................... 1291 C. A Feature, Not a Flaw ................................................................ 1293 V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 1295 https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/7 2 Squitieri: Towards Nondelegation Doctrines 2021] TOWARDS NONDELEGATION DOCTRINES 1241 I. INTRODUCTION When discussing the nondelegation doctrine, courts and scholars frequently speak of Congress’ “legislative power.”1 The Constitution, however, speaks of no such thing. Instead, the Constitution speaks of “the judicial power,”2 “the executive power,”3 and “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.”4 Working from the presumption that there is a difference between a “power” (singular) and “powers” (plural), this Article argues that the nondelegation doctrine should be transformed into a series of nondelegation doctrines, each corresponding to one of the distinct powers vested in Congress. Many of Congress’ powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.5 There, Congress is vested with the powers to, among other things, “regulate commerce,”6 “declare war,”7 “coin money,”8 and “constitute tribunals.”9 Constitutional amendments vest Congress with additional powers – for example, the “power to enforce [the voting rights granted in the Fifteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation,” 10 and the power to “by law provide for” an orderly procedure to replace the President or Vice President in the event of removal, resignation, or incapacitation.11 Given the wide variety of subjects covered by Congress’ powers, it should come as no surprise that the quest to capture all of Congress’ powers within a single nondelegation doctrine has proven to be a failure.12 See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (“The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government.”); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“[T]he legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated . . . .”); Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–280 (2021) (arguing that there was no nondelegation at the Founding if “legislative power” is defined in one of four ways); Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) [hereinafter Wurman, Founding] (“[M]uch of the earlier [nondelegation] literature focuses on . . . the meaning of the term ‘legislative power’ . . . .”). 2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 6 U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 3. 7 U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 11. 8 U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 9. 9 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 10 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 11 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 12 The Supreme Court has only twice relied on the nondelegation doctrine to hold a statute unconstitutional, both times in 1935. Cass Sunste (...truncated)