Taking Down Descartes Trademark: An objection to Descartes Ontological Argument

Global Tides, Apr 2023

Descartes attempts to prove God's existence by arguing we have an innate idea of perfection that could have only been created by an infinite source. In this paper, I object to Descartes by arguing our idea of perfection is not equatable to God. This is because our innate idea of perfection does not have enough representational content necessary to exceed our formal reality, meaning it is self-caused. In that way, our idea of perfection is less significant than Descartes would like to admit.

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Taking Down Descartes Trademark: An objection to Descartes Ontological Argument

Introduction In his third meditation, Descartes attempts to prove God's existence by arguing that our idea of God is innate, like a “trademark” that the Creator stamped on our minds. In this essay, I argue that Descartes fails to prove that God exists, so the trademark argument, as it is often called, is unsound. This is because our idea of perfection does not have the representational content necessary to claim it is equatable to God. It does not have the representational content necessary to exceed our formal reality, meaning it is self-caused. I begin by clarifying the terms Descartes uses and summarizing his argument. Afterward, I address several well-known objections that do not succeed in defeating his argument. I devote the majority of my essay to arguing that our idea of God does not have enough objective reality to have more formal reality than we have, so it is viable to say that we are the cause of our idea of God. The Trademark Argument In order to understand the trademark argument, it is necessary to be familiar with the terms Descartes uses. First, Descartes makes a distinction between formal reality and objective reality. Formal reality is the independence that a thing has from other things, whereas objective reality is an idea's representational content. The idea of “tree,” for example, and the idea of “rock” have the same amount of formal reality insofar since they are both ideas but the content of the idea of “tree” differs from the content of the idea of “rock.” Descartes distinguishes also between different levels of formal reality. There are three points on his scale of being that have varying degrees of formal reality: infinite substance, finite substance, and modes. Modes have the least amount of formal reality because they are a particular determination of a property. For example, an idea is a mode of the mind because it inheres in the mind's existence. This means that an idea cannot occur without the mind, so it is dependent on the mind to exist. In contrast, the mind, as a substance, does not inhere in anything for its existence. It does not rely on anything to exist except for itself. It follows that the mind has more formal reality than an idea insofar as it relies on less to sustain its existence. However, the mind is finite insofar as it comes into existence, qua life, goes out of existence, qua death, and Descartes will say relies on God as the sustainer of its existence. The mind is limited, whereas an infinite substance is not limited by anything. An infinite substance is the sustainer of its own existence, meaning it relies on nothing but itself to exist. Since it has the highest level of independence from other substances, it has the most formal reality. The objective reality an idea has is proportional to its formal reality. To return to the point above, the idea of God and the idea of a rock are similar insofar as they are both ideas, but one represents a rock whereas the other represents an infinite substance. Because the idea of God represents more than what the idea of a rock represents, the idea of God has more formal reality than the idea of a rock. Likewise, since the idea of God has the most formal reality in what it represents, it is also the most objectively real. The last thing to characterize is Descartes' causal principle. He claims that “there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect.” The efficient cause of X is the primary thing that brings it into existence, while the total cause of X includes its shape, matter, and purpose.1 A NASA computer engineer, For example, is the total and efficient cause of a NASA supercomputer. The point of Descartes's causal principle is that there cannot be more formal reality in an effect than in a cause.2 If I happened upon a blueprint for a NASA supercomputer, I would know with certainty that I, as a philosophy major, could not be the total 1 2 See Williams 125 for a more comprehensive explanation of this claim. An instantiation of the self-evident truth that something can’t come from nothing. See Tlumak, 33 or efficient cause of the blueprint. I know I am not the creator of the blueprint because I don’t have the knowledge required to create it. In Descartes’s terms, this is because there is nothing in me that could create something that contains the objective reality of the blueprint. I simply lack the sophisticated concepts that describe the representational content necessary to build a supercomputer. This line of reasoning leads Descartes to conclude that “what is more perfect cannot derive from what is less perfect.”3 Just as it is evident that I cannot be the cause of the supercomputer, it is evident that something that is perfect has more formal reality than something that is less perfect. Therefore, the less perfect thing cannot be the cause of the greater perfection. I grant, however, that Descartes is correct to claim that an effect cannot have more formal reality than a cause. Keeping his terms at hand, the following is a brief outline of Descartes' argument: Descartes rightly claims that by virtue of the fact that I can doubt, I have an idea of imperfection. This is because doubt reflects incomplete knowledge, which is an imperfect version of complete knowledge. To have an idea of imperfection is to simultaneously have an idea of perfection. This idea of perfection, he says, is synonymous with God. He adds that God must “be actually infinite so that nothing can be added to his perfection.”4 Since nothing can come from nothing, what caused this idea to exist? Descartes argues that I cannot be the cause of my idea of God because I lack the attributes of perfection (i.e. omniscience, omnipotence, and so forth) contained within my idea of God. God has more formal reality than I have and the source of my idea of God must have at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. And God is the only thing that meets this standard, so he must be the cause of the idea. Below is the argument put in the premise-conclusion format: 1. I have an idea of perfection. a. I have an idea of imperfection i. I can doubt ii. Doubt is imperfect knowledge 2. To have an idea of perfection is to have an idea of God a. Contained within my idea of perfection is infinite knowledge. b. Infinite knowledge is equivalent to God. 3. My idea of God must have a cause. a. Nothing comes from nothing. 4. If my idea of God has the same formal reality as God, then only God could have caused it. a. An effect cannot exceed the formal reality contained in its cause. 5. My idea of God has the same formal reality as God. a. Contained within my idea of God is the objective reality in attributes of perfection (omnipotence, omnipresence, and so forth). 6. Therefore, God could have been the only cause of this idea implying he exists. Failed Objections to the Trademark Argument In this section, I address several objections to the trademark argument that do not go fa (...truncated)


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Nathaniel Lannen. Taking Down Descartes Trademark: An objection to Descartes Ontological Argument, Global Tides, 2023, pp. 2, Volume 17, Issue 1,