Collapsing the Complicated/Complex Distinction: It's Complexity all the Way Down

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 21(1), 1-17, 2023 COLLAPSING THE COMPLICATED/COMPLEX DISTINCTION: IT’S COMPLEXITY ALL THE WAY DOWN Ragnar van der Merwe University of Johannesburg, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities Johannesburg, The Republic of South Africa DOI: 10.7906/indecs.21.1.1 Regular article Received: 15 July 2022. Accepted: 21 February 2023. ABSTRACT Several complexity theorists draw a sharp and ontologically robust distinction between (merely) complicated systems and (genuinely) complex systems. I argue that this distinction does not hold. Upon fine-grained analysis, ostensibly complicated systems turn out to be complex systems. The purported boundary between the complicated and the complex appears to be vague rather than sharp. Systems are complex by degrees. KEY WORDS complex systems, complexity theory, Stuart Kauffman, Sandra Mitchell, Edgar Morin CLASSIFICATION JEL: C51 *Corresponding author, : ; -; *University of Johannesburg, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Kingsway Campus, Corner *Kingsway and University Road, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2000, The Republic of South Africa* R. van der Merwe INTRODUCTION Is the world complex or are only parts of the world complex? One’s answer to this question has significant implications in both science and philosophy. If the world is complex, then our models, predictions, and manipulations of it will always be partial and limited. This is because complexity, almost by definition, implies some recalcitrance to epistemic capture. However, if only parts of the world are complex – if some parts are merely complicated – then we can presumably come to model, predict, and manipulate the complicated parts precisely. Although the above question has these epistemic consequences, the answer itself relates to ontology. I will however limit my discussion to systems rather than make ontological claims about the world as a whole. So, the question at hand becomes “are systems complex or are some systems complex while others are complicated?” The same consequences follow, but specifically as they relate to systems. We can take systems to be that which constitutes the subject matter of science. As Sandra Mitchell states, “[c]ontemporary science studies complex structures and behaviors at a variety of levels of organization ... using representations of different degrees of precision, from fineto coarse-grained” [1; p.178]. On my account, a system is not a fundamental entity or structure. Fundamental entities or structures (assuming there are such things) are not standardly categorised as either complicated or complex. This dichotomy is applied to systems, and that will be my focus here. If some scientists are studying fundamental entities and structures (a matter that is open to debate), then my argument will not apply to whatever their subject matter is (quantum particles and forces or supersymmetric string perhaps). Systems do though seem to be composed of or structured out of whatever is fundamental. Roughly, one might think of systems as ‘clumps’ (or what Edgar Morin calls a “tangle” [2; p.84]) of whatever is fundamental. Systems are the clumps of world stuff studied by scientists not engaged in fundamental ontological inquiry. This should be relatively uncontroversial. I am not aware of any thesis that posits systems as fundamental. I think most would agree that systems are what is usually called emergent. They emerge from some thing(s) and/or process(es) more fundamental. I will though not discuss emergence in any detail here (see however [2] and [3]). Emergence is a big philosophical topic that is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, we can debate the nature of systems without considering exactly how they emerge. My direct concern is with whether systems are complicated or complex, and not with how they come about. My argument is that systems appear to be complex by degrees rather than divided into complicated and complex types. Several writers contributing to the complexity literature draw a sharp and ontologically robust – i.e. joint-carving – distinction between (genuinely) complex systems and (merely) complicated systems. Complex systems: It is questionable whether ‘complex system’ can be defined by a single and neatly comprehensible term [1-3]. However, following Richardson and Cilliers, a complex system is roughly a “a system that is comprised of a large number of entities that display a high level of nonlinear interactivity” [4; p.8] (emphasis removed). Most importantly, complex systems are systems whose behaviour is irreducible to any comprehensible algorithm, set of rules, or simpler constituent parts. Complex systems are recalcitrant to exact modelling, prediction, or manipulation, and they cannot be understood completely. Our epistemic grasp on complex systems is necessarily partial and limited. We cannot know whether the parts of a complex system we isolate during modelling constitute the essential characteristics of that system. 2 Collapsing the complicated/complex distinction: It’s complexity all the way down Complicated systems: Complicated systems are systems that may appear complex but are, in fact, simple. Their behaviour is reducible to some comprehensible algorithm, set of rules, or simpler constituent parts. Complicated systems can, in principle, be modelled, predicted, manipulated, and understood precisely. I will call the purported distinction between complex systems and complicated systems CCD. According to Paul Cilliers, when it comes to complicated systems, “if you work hard enough, with clever enough techniques, you can figure the system out” [5; p.7]. In contrast, “grappling” with complex systems “requires a more reflexive and transformative approach” [5; p.7]. For Cilliers, we should recognise and even embrace the indubitable partiality and limitedness involved in our inquiries into the nature of complex systems. According to Minka Woermann and colleagues [6], complicated systems are dealt with in the “restricted paradigm”, while complex systems are dealt with in the “general paradigm”. In the restricted paradigm, complex systems are epistemically complex but ontologically complicated. We might think that some system is genuinely complex, but, upon analysis, it turns out to be merely complicated. In the general paradigm, complex systems are both epistemically and ontologically complex. No matter what clever techniques we employ, we can never isolate the system in order to model, predict, and manipulate it completely. Note that proponents of CCD are not merely making the epistemic claim that our theories or models draw a distinction between complicated systems and complex systems. Instead, they are making the metaphysical claim that systems have a dualistic constitution; two types of systems exist: complicated and complex ones. CCD is thus manifestly ontological. As such, my argument does not apply to those who think that a distin (...truncated)