Is There a Right to Revelatory Autonomy?

Res Publica https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-025-09708-z Is There a Right to Revelatory Autonomy? Luís Duarte d′Almeida1,2 · Euan MacDonald2 Accepted: 6 January 2025 © The Author(s) 2025 Abstract We address the question of when it is permissible to interfere in the “transformative choices” of others—choices whether or not to undergo experiences that provide us with knowledge we can only get by undergoing them, and which as a result transform our core values and preferences. In doing so, we criticise Farbod Akhlaghi’s recent (2023) claim to have discovered a new moral right, such that interference in the transformative choices of others is permissible when and only when the chooser’s “right to revelatory autonomy” (RRA) is outweighed. In building our case for a more plausible answer to the question, we challenge all aspects of Akhlaghi’s account. We first argue that it fares no better epistemically than other accounts he rejects, and that it fails to provide a more plausible explanation of permissible interference. We then examine RRA itself closely, showing that on its most plausible reading it is both over-inclusive (since it cannot hold in relation to a wide range of transformative choices) and under-inclusive (since it would hold for many choices unlikely to be transformative in the relevant sense). While Akhlaghi’s core insight—that our practices of interference (including by attempts to rationally persuade) in the transformative choices of others are much less likely to be justified than we standardly take them to be—is both true and important, the deontic innovation with which he tries to illuminate this point serves only to obscure it. Keywords Transformative experiences · Interpersonal ethics · Liberties · Duties of non-interference · Autonomy Euan MacDonald Luís Duarte d′Almeida 1 NOVA School of Law and CEDIS, R&D Centre on Law and Society, Lisbon, Portugal 2 Edinburgh Law School, Edinburgh, UK 13 L. Duarte d´Almeida, E. MacDonald Introduction The literature on transformative choices has begun to expand from its original focus on rational choice into questions of interpersonal ethics.1 One recent contribution in this regard is by Farbod Akhlaghi (2023), who introduces what he calls: (The Question) Under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible to interfere to try to prevent another from making a transformative choice? (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 4) Akhlaghi claims to have made “significant progress” in answering The Question by identifying two moral positions that, according to him, obtain with regard to transformative choices: a “right to revelatory autonomy” (“RRA”), and a correlative “duty of revelatory non-interference” (“DRNI”): (RRA) The moral right to autonomously decide to discover how one’s life will go and who one will become by making a transformative choice. (DRNI) The moral duty not to interfere in the autonomous self-making of others, through their choosing to undergo transformative experiences to discover who they will become. (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 9) Under “interference”, importantly, Akhlaghi includes not only manipulation, coercion, and force, but also rational persuasion.2 In this paper, we seek to make some progress of our own in answering The Question by critically engaging with Akhlaghi’s arguments. While Akhlaghi’s own answer to The Question fails, it fails in illuminating ways. Somewhat ironically, Akhlaghi obscures what is most interesting about transformative choices by making them the subject of those two deontic positions. RRA and DRNI, seeking as they do to incorporate all and only transformative choices, are both over- and under-inclusive. But we come closer to a plausible answer to The Question if we disentangle Akhlaghi’s core insights on transformative choices from his unwarranted claim to have identified a new moral entitlement. At any rate, Akhlaghi’s own argument in support of RRA moves quickly. He says only that “it is highly plausible that we have” such a right, which is “grounded” in the “value of autonomous self-making” (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 8). Nor does he give an independent argument in support of DRNI, which he takes to be straightforwardly “gen1 For the original focus on rational choice, see Ullmann-Margalit (2006); Paul (2014, 2015a); the contributions to the special issue in Res Philosophica (2015, 92:2) and to the symposium in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2015, 91:3); and Pettigrew (2019). One author who considers issues of moral permissibility in relation to transformative choice is Howard (2015), although she asks the different question of the conditions under which it is permissible to make transformative choices on behalf of others (e.g., parents for their infant children). 2 “There are numerous forms of interference in another’s decision-making. For example, Charlie might coerce, manipulate, rationally persuade or force Adam not to become a parent. In what follows, ‘interference’ refers to any of these” (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 5). 13 Is There a Right to Revelatory Autonomy? erated”—logically implied, by correlativity—by RRA (Akhlaghi 2023, pp. 8–9). He then seeks to show that his solution succeeds where others have failed in providing a plausible explanation of when and why it is permissible to interfere with someone’s transformative choices. In building our case, we will call into question all of Akhlaghi’s arguments. We start with the claim that his account avoids the difficulties others have faced. We then ask whether RRA itself is plausible. And then we tease out the substance of Akhlaghi’s core insight, explaining why it need not lead us to recognise any “new” moral right. Does RRA Succeed Where Other Answers Fail? Akhlaghi defines transformative experiences as those that are “both epistemically and personally transformative” (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 6). Setting out examples meant to guide our intuitions in answering The Question, his focus is first on: (Family) Adam is Charlie’s brother. Adam is considering whether to become a parent. Charlie considers trying to stop Adam from doing so. (Akhlaghi 2023, p. 4) When, if at all, would it be permissible for Charlie to interfere in Adam’s choice? Akhlaghi considers (in order to reject) three possible answers: that interference is permissible “just when that experience will be a negative epistemically or personally transformative experience”; “just when it is in the best interests of that person for [Charlie] to do so”; or “just when the choice will not maximize expected utility”. Each represents a way in which interference in someone’s transformative choice might be thought, as we will put it, for their own good. Each of these answers, Akhlaghi claims, faces the same two difficulties. The first is that transformative experiences are by definition epistemically inaccessible: we cannot know what they will be like without undergoing them. The second is that since our core preferences and desires change as a result of such experiences, we do not (...truncated)