“Absolute and Arbitrary”: How the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Power Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine

BYU Law Review Volume 50 Issue 4 Article 7 6-30-2025 “Absolute and Arbitrary”: How the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Power Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine Dinis Cheian Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dinis Cheian, “Absolute and Arbitrary”: How the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Power Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine, 50 BYU L. Rev. 963 (2025). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss4/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact . 2.CHEIAN.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/25 8:15 PM “Absolute and Arbitrary”: How the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Power Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine Dinis Cheian* The Exceptions Clause of Article III of the Constitution is clear that “Congress” “shall make” the rules prescribing the Court’s “appellate jurisdiction.” And so Congress did for almost 150 years. But in the twentieth century, Congress delegated its power to the Supreme Court in the form of—as Chief Justice Taft demanded—”absolute and arbitrary” discretion to pick its appellate cases. Today, under the resulting certiorari regime, the Court enjoys that unbridled discretion in selecting its cases. Because Congress delegated its power to the Court without articulating “an intelligible principle,” certiorari jurisdiction violates the nondelegation doctrine and is unconstitutional. This Article is the first to advance this bold and novel claim. In addition to its constitutional argument, the Article sets forth a roadmap for litigants to challenge the certiorari process. This Article first provides an overview of numerous facets of the doctrine as it has developed to demonstrate that, whatever the mode of analysis, the doctrine applies regardless of the branch to which Congress is delegating. It then examines the Exceptions Clause, which reserves exclusively to Congress the power to regulate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Because Congress has this power, it has a duty to articulate an intelligible principle in delegating away that power—yet it plainly did not. * Dinis Cheian. Associate, Susman Godfrey; J.D., Harvard Law School, Magna Cum Laude; M. Eng., B.S. 2016 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The statements and views expressed in this Article are my own and do not reflect those of Susman Godfrey LLP or its clients. The article is intended for general purposes only, and the statements and views expressed herein do not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion. I want to express my sincere gratitude to Professors Jonathan Adler, Jack Goldsmith, Ilan Wurman, Josh Blackman, Tyler Lindley as well as to Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Matthew E. Ladew, J. Jacob Marsh, Charlotte Lepic, and Raj Mathur for their invaluable comments that have considerably improved this Article. All mistakes are my own. 963 2.CHEIAN.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 5/21/25 8:15 PM 50:4 (2025) In addition to calling attention to an important, continuing constitutional violation, this Article also aims to add to the current field of scholarship, which focuses on delegations to the Executive Branch. This Article aims to reinvigorate the discussion surrounding the nondelegation doctrine, including the discussion of delegations among other branches—in both directions. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 965 I. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE ................................................................. 969 A. The Three Strands of the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its One Good Year ................................................................................................970 1. The Exclusivity and Importance Strands .......................................... 970 2. The Intelligible Principle Strand ....................................................... 972 3. One Good Year .................................................................................. 976 B. The Dormant Period and the Morphing Into Canons .......................978 C. The Resurgence of the Nondelegation Doctrine ................................982 D. The Post-Gundy Academic Debate .......................................................986 E. Nondelegation to the Judiciary.............................................................996 II. THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE ............................................................................ 999 A. The Meaning of the Exceptions Clause .............................................1000 B. The Exceptions Clause and Congress ................................................1002 C. The History of the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction.............................1009 III. THE CERTIORARI POWER VIOLATES THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE ....... 1012 A. Congress Delegated to the Court the Discretion to Select Its Cases .......................................................................................................1013 B. The Intelligible Principle Strand .........................................................1018 1. Text provides no intelligible principle ............................................. 1019 2. The legislative history establishes that the certiorari statutes were written to lack an intelligible principle ................................... 1020 3. Although the Court’s regulations are irrelevant to the analysis, they provide no intelligible principle either ..................................... 1021 C. The Importance and Exclusivity Strands ..........................................1023 D. Some Practical Considerations............................................................1026 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 1029 964 2.CHEIAN.FIN.NH.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 965 5/21/25 8:15 PM The Certiorari Power and the Nondelegation Doctrine INTRODUCTION The central claim of this Article is simple: the Constitution vests the power to regulate the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction exclusively into Congress. The Court demanded that Congress delegate that power to the Court. And Congress did just that, delegating to the Court “absolute and arbitrary” discretion over its appellate docket. That violates the nondelegation doctrine. Today, the Supreme Court has unbridled discretion in selecting its cases. Together, 28 USC § 1254 and § 1257 define what is known as the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction and bestow unchecked power upon the Court by saying only that it “may . . . review[]” cases.1 This is a relatively modern development. For most of the United States’ history, the Court had no discretion in picking its cases.2 Instead, its docket w (...truncated)