NATO's Credibility in the Kosovo War

Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies Volume 28 Article 7 1-1-2011 NATO's Credibility in the Kosovo War Sead Osmani Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma Recommended Citation Osmani, Sead (2011) "NATO's Credibility in the Kosovo War," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 28 , Article 7. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol28/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact , . NATO's Credibility in the Kosovo War Sead Osmani Introduction Before the conflict started in Kosovo, leaders from the u.s. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) explained why they intended to intervene in Kosovo. They most strongly emphasized the reason as humanitarian intervention. With research and comparison, I argue that sustaining NATO's credibility was the most important reason. After the Cold War, Europe autonomously initiated security projects. The main foreign policy interests of the U.s. and the EU started to diverge. The differing interests eventually evoked discussions regarding the future of NATO, with NATO officials offering various reasons for their participation in the Kosovo War, such as ending violence and repression, and the withdrawal of the military, police, and paramilitary forces from Kosovo (NATO 2010). Were these goals NATO's strongest motivation? Because the principal player in the Kosovo War was the U.s., and because NATO is the instrument through which the u.s. perpetuates its hegemOnic role in Europe, I will use the official U.S. Department of State document regarding the Kosovo War to demonstrate that preserving NATO's credibility was actually the most important reason for the U.s. and NATO to participate in the Kosovo war. The Department of State official statement on the war in Kosovo outlines three objectives for u.s. and NATO participation in Kosovo. The first objective is "Averting a humanitarian catastrophe." I analyze whether Kosovo was the most pressing humanitarian crisis in which NATO could have intervened and the level of success it achieved in this effort. NATO did not accomplish this proclaimed goal, because the goal was actually an excuse to intervene in Kosovo. The second Department of State objective is "Preserving stability in a key part of Europe." With statements from the 65 SIGMA interested country leaders involved in this objective, I will demonstrate stability was not truly at risk. The last section will offer my proposed explanation that the u.s. and NATO intervened in Kosovo to preserve NATO's credibility. Literature Review The intervention by NATO has been the subject of a great deal of academic commentary. NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization for the attack on Yugoslavia, and the peculiar nature of the Kosovo conflict has led many scholars to be divided in their opinions. They can be grouped into two categories: those who write about NATO's illegitimacy in attacking (Hehir 2009 and Menon 2001) and those who try to find legitimacy for this attack (Greenwood 2000, Roberts 1999, and Glennon 1999). Scholars of the first category argue U.s'/NATO did not seek UN Security Council authorization to attack; therefore, the intervention was illegal. These scholars fail to explain the reason U.S./NATO intervened without authorization. The second category of scholars argue that while the U.s'/NATO did not have explicit authorization, through the resolutions written for Yugoslavia, NATO had implicit authorization from the UN Secretary General. Therefore, it was not necessary to request further authorization. This plausible explanation essentially justifies a controversial move. However, the UN Charter explains clearly that it is necessary to obtain authorization for such moves. Explanations of how NATO avoided getting explicit authorization for its actions unavoidably hint that NATO had underlying motives for doing so. Those motivations have yet to be fully explored. Many justify NATO's intervention citing humanitarian and moral duties, despite the lack of legitimacy in attacking (Randy 2001, D' Amato 2001 and Simma 1999). However, these claims can be questioned because NATO's use of force against Serbs ultimately resulted in as many deaths as had already occurred (Herscher 2010). Others try to explain that NATO's attack was biased and was driven by other motivations such as economic interests or on distracting attention from the Lewinski sex scandal (Cohn 2002 and Bulent 2002). The U.s./NATO attack in Yugoslavia was illegal. In international law, there is no such thing as a "humanitarian" attack. The U.S. wanted no international security in Yugoslavia other than NATO, wherein their power is vested. The most powerful motivation for NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the Department of State's third stated objective: to preserve NATO's credibility (Ong 2003, Cooper 1999, and Dempsey 1999). U.S. and NATO Objectives in Kosovo On 26 March 1999, the Department of State released an official statement entitled "U.S. and NATO objectives and interests in Kosovo." It declares: "The U.S. and NATO objectives in Kosovo are to stop the killing and achieve a durable peace that prevents further repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar people." After this statement, it is listed that the u.s. had three strong interests at stake 66 OSMANI (U.S. Department of State 1999): 1) Averting a humanitarian catastrophe; 2) Preserving stability in a key part of Europe; and 3) Maintaining the credibility of NATO. Two days prior to the u.s. Department of State release, President Ointon appeared on national television and set down similar objectives, adding, "Our mission is clear: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course" (U.S. Department of State 1999). Although the first two interests listed in the Department of State statement might be reasonable justification for entering the Kosovo war, they were not achieved and were rhetorical rather than authentic. In other words, they look like "pretexts for U.s. and NATO policy, not motives behind the policy" (Layne 1999). The strongest motivation was evidently to maintain NATO's credibility at all costs, but the other reasons were needed to support that objective. Averting a Humanitarian Catastrophe Averting a humanitarian catastrophe was the first objective highlighted by the U.s. Department of State and President Clinton. Rather than achieving the objectives, the air campaign instead launched the crisis into colossal proportions. According to James Bovard, a policy advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation, "The CIA had warned the Clinton administration that if bombing (...truncated)