The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?
Pepperdine Policy Review
Volume 4
Article 5
1-1-2011
The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of
Reducing Violence in Mexico?
Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh
Pepperdine University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr
Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Abu-Hamdeh, Sabrina (2011) "The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?," Pepperdine Policy Review:
Vol. 4, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/ppr/vol4/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Policy at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Pepperdine Policy Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
.
The Merida Initiative: An Effective
Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?
Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh
In recent decades, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico have had
the dubious honor of being key players in the global drug market. Today,
South America is the lone producer of cocaine for the world. Mexico and
Colombia provide the United States with its primary source of opiates
and play central roles in the marijuana trade and the foreign production
of methamphetamines.1 The main pathway for illegal drugs to enter the
United States is the Central America-Mexico corridor, where it is estimated
that ninety percent of all the cocaine entering the United States arrives.
As a result, the Latin American drug trade is big business: Colombian
and Mexican drug trafficking organizations make an estimated $18 to $39
billion annually in wholesale drug profits.2 In 2008, the National Drug
Intelligence Center reported that Mexican drug trafficking organizations
are the “greatest organized crime threat” to the United States today, due
to the increased distribution and transportation networks Mexican cartels
have put in place to meet US need.3
After the inauguration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon in
2006, and his subsequent pledge to battle corruption and drug trafficking,
drug violence surged in areas dominated by the most prominent drug
organizations. The death toll rose as these groups fought each other and
the Mexican government for coveted control of lucrative drug routes.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released a report stating
that, though crime rates and homicides decreased worldwide, homicides
increased in Latin America, Mexico and the Caribbean from 19.9 per
Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh is a second year student at SPP graduating with concentrations
in Economics and International Relations. She presented this paper at the Pacific Coast
Conference of Latin American Studies in November 2011.
37
Pepperdine Policy Review— Spring 2011
100,000 in 2003 to 32.6 per 100,000 in 2008.4 According to recent studies,
income inequality, political instability and crime have all contributed
to the increases in violence, but the major factor is the drug trade. Exact
numbers of drug-related deaths are disputed, but according to the TransBorder Institute at the University of California, San Diego, there were
2,120 Mexican cartel-related homicides in 2006; 2,280 in 2007; 5,153 in 2008;
6,587 in 2009; and already the highest number yet in 2010 with 5,775. Since
2007, shortly after President Calderon’s declaration of a war on drugs, an
estimated 28,228 drug trade related deaths have been reported.5
Increased anxiety over the escalating violence and increased drug
trafficking between US border states and northern Mexico led US lawmakers
to create anti-drug assistance programs to lessen drug-related violence
and drug trafficking into the United States. These programs met with little
success as increased internal corruption, ever more powerful drug cartels,
and increased poverty plagued Mexico. With relations continuing to cool
between the United States and Mexico, President Calderon extended an
olive branch in 2007 and requested the help of the United States with
counterdrug efforts and assistance.6 He also pointedly remarked on the
United States’ role as a major consumer of Mexican drugs when he stated
at the Merida Conference, “While there is no reduction in demand in your
territory, it will be very difficult to reduce the supply in ours.”7
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the
Merida Initiative, a $1.4 billion proposal for US assistance in Mexico and
Central America’s drug war for FY 2008-FY 2010.8 For the 2008 fiscal year,
Congress allocated $400 million for Mexico and $65 million for Central
America. This marked a shift in US foreign drug policy, as until this time
Colombia had been the main recipient of US aid, not Mexico. According to
the US Department of State, Colombia received $600 million for FY 2006,
while Mexico received approximately $40 million.9 As the US enters its
fourth year of Merida Initiative implementation, it is important to assess
whether or not it has been a successful policy. The intention of the United
States and Mexico was to reduce the drug trafficking problem, cartel
influence, and associated violence and corruption, while restoring order
to much of Mexico through implementation of the initiative. This paper
38
Abu-Hamdeh—The Merida Initiative
will address the viability of the Merida Initiative as an effective policy for
reducing continued drug-related violence and homicide in Mexico.
Literature Review
Though extensive literature surrounds the Merida Initiative, the focus
of this analysis will be three aspects of the program: the background of
the proposal, the implementation and accountability of the program, and
critiques of the program as a counter-drug policy.
The Merida Initiative was intensely debated in Congress; lawmakers
were hesitant to pass an aid proposal in light of the Mexican history of
government corruption. Proponents of the initiative stressed that equipment
and training, rather than direct cash transfers, would be offered to Mexico
in an effort to curtail potential corruption.10 The goal of the proposal was
to maximize the effectiveness of already existing programs to curb drug,
human, and weapons trafficking through four different types of funding:
counternarcotics/counterterrorism/border security; public security/law
enforcement; institution building; and rule of law and program support. At
its inception, the main objectives of the Merida Initiative were to: 1) break
the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) strengthen border,
air and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the
region; and 4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand.11
No additional funding for US anti-drug efforts was appropriated in
the initiative, though the document cited several US counterdrug programs
already in place.12 The result of both Senate and House of Representatives
amendments to the proposed initiative was approval of $400 million for
Mex (...truncated)