Greater Happiness for a Greater Number

Journal of Happiness Studies, May 2010

Utilitarian philosophy holds that public policy should aim at greater happiness for a greater number of people. This moral tenet meets many objections, on pragmatic grounds it is denounced as unfeasible and on ideological grounds as undesirable. As a result the principle is marginal in policy making. In this paper I consider these classic philosophical qualms in the light of recent empirical research on life-satisfaction. The data show first of all that the principle is feasible; happiness of a great number is possible in contemporary conditions and it is also possible to create more of it. The data also show that the promotion of happiness fits well with other ideals; happiness requires conditions that we value, such as freedom, and happiness fosters matters that we value, such as good health and civil behaviour. Though happiness can conflict with these values in theory, it appears to match them in practice.

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Greater Happiness for a Greater Number

Is that Possible 0 Desirable? 0 0 R. Veenhoven (&) Erasmus University Rotterdam , Rotterdam, The Netherlands Utilitarian philosophy holds that public policy should aim at greater happiness for a greater number of people. This moral tenet meets many objections, on pragmatic grounds it is denounced as unfeasible and on ideological grounds as undesirable. As a result the principle is marginal in policy making. In this paper I consider these classic philosophical qualms in the light of recent empirical research on life-satisfaction. The data show first of all that the principle is feasible; happiness of a great number is possible in contemporary conditions and it is also possible to create more of it. The data also show that the promotion of happiness fits well with other ideals; happiness requires conditions that we value, such as freedom, and happiness fosters matters that we value, such as good health and civil behaviour. Though happiness can conflict with these values in theory, it appears to match them in practice. 1 The Greatest Happiness Principle During the Middle Ages it was widely believed that happiness is not possible in earthly life and that the basis of morality is in the word of God. These views were contested in the Enlightenment; happiness came to be seen as attainable and morality was regarded as man-made. A lively discussion on the relation between happiness and morality emerged (Mauzi 1960; Buijs 2007) and in that climate an instrumental view on morality appeared, in which ethical codes are seen as ways of securing a happy life. A similar text was published in Dutch in Ethiek en Maatschappij (Ethics and Society) 2009, 12: 2550. An earlier English version appeared in: Alex Linley & Stephen Joseph (Eds.) Positive Psychology in Practice Wiley 2004, chapter 39, pp. 658678. Much of that enlighted thought is reflected in Jeremy Benthams (1789) Introduction to morals and legislation. Bentham argues that the moral quality of action should be judged by its consequences on human happiness and in that line he claims that we should aim at the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Bentham defined happiness in terms of psychological experience, as the sum of pleasures and pains. His philosophy is known as utilitarianism, because of its emphasis on the utility of behavioral consequences. Happyism would have been a better name, since this utility is seen as contribution to happiness. When applied at the level of individual choice (actor utilitarianism), this tenet runs into some difficulties. One problem is that often one cannot foresee what the balance of effects on happiness will be. Another problem is that the principle deems well-intended behavior to be a-moral if it happens to pan out adversely. Imagine the case of a loving mother who saves the life of her sick child, a child that grows up to be a criminal; mothers can seldom foresee a childs future and can hardly be reproached for their unconditional motherly love. The principle is better suited for judging general rules, such as the rule that mothers should care for their sick children. It is fairly evident that adherence to this rule will add to the happiness of a great number. Following such rules is then morally correct, even if consequences might be negative in a particular case. This variant is known as Rule-Utilitarianism. When applied to public policy the principle is also called Political Utilitarianism and holds that institutions, laws and social policy should maximize happiness. Bentham used the greatest happiness principle in that way and discussed the implications of that principle for property laws and the death penalty. Interest in such applications is rising these days. For example, Layard (2005) pleas on this ground for higher income tax and more investment in mental health care. 1.1 Objections Against the Principle The greatest happiness principle is well known, and it is a standard subject in every introduction to moral philosophy. Yet the principle is seldom put into practice. Why is this? The answer to this question is also to be found in most introductory philosophy books: Utilitarianism is typically rejected, both on pragmatic and on moral grounds. Pragmatic Objections Application of the greatest happiness principle requires that we know what happiness is and that we can predict the consequences of behavioral alternatives on it. It also requires that we can check the results of applying this principle, that is, that we can measure resulting gains in happiness. At a more basic level the principle assumes that happiness can be affected by what we do. All of this is typically denied. It is claimed that happiness is an elusive concept, and one that we cannot measure. As a consequence we can only make guesses about the effects on happiness on policy alternatives and can never verify our suppositions. Some even see happiness as an immutable trait that cannot be influenced. Such criticism often ends with the conclusion that we would do better to stick to more palpable seasoned virtues, such as justice and equality. Moral Objections The main ethical objection holds that the greatest happiness principle justifies a-moral means, such as genetic manipulation, mind-control and dictatorship. Another common objection is that happiness is mere pleasure or an illusionary matter and hence not very valuable in and of itself. It is also claimed that happiness spoils; in particular that it fosters irresponsible consumerism and that it makes us less sensitive to the suffering of others. Much of these ethical qualms feature in Huxleys (1935) Brave New World. 1.2 Plan of this Paper All this is armchair theorizing, mainly by philosophers and novelists. How do these objections stand up to empirical tests? Below I will first consider the pragmatic objections (Sect. 2) and next the ideological qualms (Sect. 3). I will draw on the empirical findings on happiness gathered in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2010a).1 2 Is Happiness a Practicable Goal? Pragmatic objections against the greatest happiness principle are many. The most basic objection is that happiness cannot be defined and that all talk about happiness is therefore mere rhetoric. The second objection is that happiness cannot be measured, so that we can never establish an absolute degree and number for happiness. A third objection holds that lasting happiness of a great number is not possible, that we can at best find some relief in fleeting moments of delusion. The last claim is that we cannot bring about happiness. These objections will strike many readers of this journal as outdated. Still it is useful to consider the evidence for and against for each of them. 2.1 Can Happiness be Defined? The word happiness has different meanings and these meanings are often mixed up, which gives the concept a reputation for being elusive. Yet a confusion of tongues about a word does not mean that no substantive meaning can be defined. (...truncated)


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Ruut Veenhoven. Greater Happiness for a Greater Number, Journal of Happiness Studies, 2010, pp. 605-629, Volume 11, Issue 5, DOI: 10.1007/s10902-010-9204-z