Temptation in Mengzi 1A7

Dao https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-024-09956-5 Temptation in Mengzi 1A7 Joonho Lee1 Accepted: 2 September 2024 © The Author(s) 2024 Abstract The harmony thesis about a virtuous person, widely held by neo-Aristotelians, supposes that someone highly vulnerable to temptation is not virtuous at all. However, is that the only plausible picture of a virtuous person’s psychology? This essay aims to offer an alternative picture by discussing the account of virtue in the thought of Mengzi 孟子 and his conception of moral exemplars. First, I analyze the Mengzian moral exemplar as depicted in Mengzi 1A7—specifically, the susceptibility of the nobleman (junzi 君子) to compassion and the relevant temptation. Then, I explain how this differs from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories. This passage shows that there is a certain price to being virtuous in Mengzi’s virtue theory. By examining various ways of addressing this challenge, I explore Mengzi’s solution to it, which will shed light on Mengzi’s own way of specifying virtue and its significant advantage as a potential alternative to certain other approaches. Keywords Mengzi 孟子 · Temptation · Compassion · Moral exemplars · Neo-Aristotelianism · Virtue ethics “I don’t like food. I love it. If I don’t love it, I don’t swallow.” —Anton Ego, in Ratatouille (Bird 2007) 1 Introduction Anton Ego, an infamous food critic in the film Ratatouille (Bird 2007), has an ardent passion for food. Per his statement above, he loves food so much that he does not swallow any bite that he does not love. Now, suppose that his passion for food not only leads him to refuse to eat any dish he does not love, but also makes it difficult for him to actually swallow it. If such were the case, it would turn out that literally * Joonho Lee 1 Philosophy Department, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 1000 Hilltop Circle PAHB Room 466, Baltimore, MD 21250, USA Vol.:(0123456789) Joonho Lee he can have a meal only when he is in a fine restaurant. His strong passion for food may be an essential virtue for maintaining his career as a renowned food critic. However, if such a virtue comes with that sort of constraint, then it will make his daily life quite difficult in certain ways. Should he accept this constraint in order to be a good food critic? In this essay, I want to ask an analogous question about moral agents. Is there something (like Anton Ego’s passion) that constitutes an essential part of moral agency yet could hinder one from living well in many circumstances? Should a moral agent bite the bullet, as my hypothetical Anton Ego has done? This essay aims to answer these questions by clarifying Mengzi’s 孟子 view of virtue and the relevant hallmark of the Mengzian moral exemplar observed in the anecdote of the nobleman (junzi 君子) in Mengzi 1A7.1 I will first sort out some salient features of the Mengzian moral exemplar. Then, I will explain how those features differ from those of the neo-Aristotelian virtuous agent. The difference between the Mengzian nobleman and the neo-Aristotelian virtuous agent is that unlike the latter, the former is susceptible to temptation, caused and characterized by his virtue. This susceptibility will elucidate a distinct type of internal conflict—as a practical cost for being virtuous—entailed by the nobleman’s psychology. Some Western-oriented virtue ethicists and neo-Aristotelians might regard this feature as a theoretical defect in Mengzi’s account of virtue, leading them to dismiss his virtue theory as a viable rival to Aristotle’s view. To anticipate and preempt that possible response, I will consider some possible implications of this practical cost for being virtuous, which shed light on Mengzi’s own way of specifying virtue and its significant advantage as an alternative to certain other approaches. 2 Background Analysis of Mengzi 1A7 As will be familiar to scholars, in Mengzi 1A7 King Xuan 宣 asks how Mengzi knows that the king could secure his people, which speaks to his ability to become a true (i.e., sage) king. Mengzi replies by quoting an incident where the king spared an ox that was supposed to be sacrificed and substituted a sheep instead. What moved the king to spare that ox was an unidentified feeling that made him unable to withstand seeing its frightened appearance, as if it was about to be executed despite being innocent. Mengzi describes the king’s action toward the ox as a “technique of benevolence” (renshu 仁術). He then introduces the remark that will be our focus here: “In the nobleman’s relation to animals, if he has seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die; if he has heard their cries, he cannot bear to eat their meat. For this reason (shiyi 是以), the nobleman keeps his distance from the kitchen” (Mengzi 1A7). 1 The numberings of the books and the chapters in the Mengzi and the Analects (Lunyu 論語) throughout this essay follow Yang 1960 and 1958, respectively. All translations of the cited passages in this essay are mine unless noted otherwise. Temptation in Mengzi 1A7 Mengzi’s lesson poses two important points about the king’s psychology. First, the king already has “the heart that cannot bear others’ suffering” (burenren zhi xin 不忍人之心),2 exemplified in his compassion toward the ox in the given incident. In Mengzian moral psychology, “the heart of compassion” (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心) is one of the four nascent moral feelings endowed in all human beings, which are introduced as the “Four Sprouts” (siduan 四端) in Mengzi 2A6. The king is already considered to have that moral quality that can make him care for other sentient beings. This constitutes the very possibility that he can secure his people. By recognizing this possibility, the king can realize his potential to be a true king. Second, the king’s substitution of the sheep for the ox somehow aligns with the nobleman’s action of avoiding the kitchen. The most obvious overlap between the king and the nobleman is that they both feel compassion toward the animals that they perceive. This makes them reluctant to take certain actions toward those animals. In Mengzi’s terminology, this overlap is described as renshu or the “technique of benevolence.” However, it is unclear what the “technique of benevolence” means here. There are three possible understandings of this term. First, renshu may speak to how benevolence is practiced (Bloom 2009: 8) in a descriptive sense. On this reading, the word shu 術 in renshu may be taken to mean a “path” rather than a “technique” that implies a deliberate and voluntary application of skill. Then, renshu indicates the “path that [one’s impulse to] benevolence follows.” Both the ox incident and the anecdote about the nobleman simply describe the mechanism of benevolence. If this is the case, then the king’s action and that of the nobleman are not necessarily something ideal or obligatory. The nobleman might still force himself to eat the animals he sees in the kitchen, if not eating them would lead him to d (...truncated)