Apr 2013
Background Against the background of increasing cost pressure in the German Health Care system German health policy introduced several law changes to increase competition within German health care system for both, payers and health care providers. At the same time law changes included centralization of decisions—counteracting a real competition. Both approaches are part of an austerity plan. The latest example for this approach is the new drug law (AMNOG) in 2011 with the core element of centralized early benefit assessment (§ 35a SGB V) for new drugs and therapies and price negotiations between federal association of health insurances and pharmaceutical company. In this review we examine the implementation of the new drug law with respect to the achievement of political objectives: Ensure sustainable financing of innovations in the German health care system, provide innovations early to the patient, decrease overregulation and establish a transparent environment in which efforts of the pharmaceutical industry are being honored by fair prices. Methods We reviewed the new AMNOG process since its implementation on 1st January 2011 and first 64 values dossiers from pharmaceutical companies that have been evaluated by G-BA (Federal Joint Committee) between January 2011 and December 2013 with respect to the above mentioned political objectives. Parameters such as added value, determination of an adequate competitor, patient relevant endpoint surrogate parameter and subgroup analysis are being discussed. Results AMNOG process has been implemented as a learning system and indeed several issues have already been addressed, such as the determination of the adequate comparator by G-BA as well as the treatment of orphan drugs in this process. Basically implementation of AMNOG and early benefit assessment is a necessary step on the way to transparent priorisation of health care benefits. But the AMNOG process is one step further towards centralization of the German health care system and therefore contradicts a healthy and fair competition within the system. As a consequence the development of high quality solutions for patients might be hampered. The analysis of the first 64 value dossiers shows that less of half of the affected patient populations (40 %) have access to new therapies being reimbursed by health insurances with a premium price. There is a major inbalance in assessment of drugs in different therapeutic areas. In combination with increased uncertainty for the pharmaceutical companies the AMNOG process on the middle and long-term might jeopardize the commitment of pharmaceutical industry in the German market. This in turn endagers the political objective to ensure patients early access to innovative therapies. Besides this, centralization of the subjective parameter “added value” seems to be problematic, since value decisions should be taken by democratic processes. We therefore suggest a model in which only objectively measurable value decisions are being taken centrally and subjective value decisions are as much as possible decentralized. This results in both a stronger competition of qualitatively best solutions for patients and in a higher fault tolerance. Instruments such as health care research and conditional reimbursement can help to enhance a fair competition for more quality in regionally organized health care and more economical allocation of short resources.
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Article home page: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40275-014-0007-4
Susanne Höhle-Pasques, Johannes Hankowitz, Peter Oberender. Drei Jahre frühe Nutzenbewertung nach §35a SGB V – kritische Würdigung und Lösungsvorschlag, 2013, pp. 13-24, Volume 11, Issue 1, DOI: 10.1007/s40275-014-0007-4